

## **A Study on the Russian Media System**

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### **Abstracts**

In less than 20 years, the collapse of the socio-political-economic system compelled rapid change in the media system and policy of Russia. The dichotomization of freedom and no freedom for the former Soviet Union was no longer applicable. In addition, the contemporary media theories could not wholly explain the state of current Russian media system and the characteristics. How to understand the contemporary media system in Russia? What types of changes did such system undergo in the last 2 decades under different socio-politically environment? How to define its current media system? In responding to these questions, this study is an attempt to analyze the different stages of reforms in Russia after democratization and the changes in the media system. One unique feature of the media system in Russia was that the development at various stage corresponded to different models. One stage was the continuation of preceding stage and subsequent stage carried the characteristics of preceding stage in completely or in part. This paper showed how Russian scholars defined the stages of media development in order to analyze the legal rules applicable

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to each stage of development, and concluded the models relevant with the Russian media system.

**Keywords:** media system, media theories, media development stages, Russia

## **Preface**

At the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, democracy rolled over Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union like tidal wave. In a matter of less than 2 decades, Russia transformed from dictatorship to democracy and from planned economy to market economy. At the same time, globalization also played a vital role that significantly affected the development of the media system in Russia. The collapse of the socio-political-economic system compelled rapid change in the media system and policy of Russia. However, Swedish scholar Jan Ekecrantz questioned the proposition of “post-communist country” because he held that the term “post” usually referred to lagged-behind development or implicating “supplements” to previous thought or a new way of thinking (if we compare this with “post-modernism”). The former dictated for a much longer period of time in order that these countries would not be labeled as “post” communist countries. The latter suggested that these countries were no longer under the previous “communist” economic system. As such, the notion of “continuation” or “supplements” were also not applicable.<sup>1</sup>

There are still a number of countries of the world who have not yet established a theoretical system featuring their own characteristics or an interpretation of their media system with philosophical foundation. Russia is an example. How should be shed light on contemporary media system in Russia? What types of

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<sup>1</sup> Ekecrantz, J. “Post-post-communist media? A Challenge for Comparative Media Studies,” in Vartanova, E. ed., *Media and Change* (Moscow: MediaMir, 2007), p.75.

changes did such system undergo in the last 2 decades under different socio-politically environment? How to define its current media policy and system? In responding to these questions, this study is an attempt to analyze the different stages of reforms in Russia after democratization and the changes in the media system. Further, literature of Western scholars on the theories of media systems were also covered for comparing the concepts of media system and explore the applicability of such system in Russia. Finally, the unique feature of the media system in Russia and possible parallel model is also analyzed.

## **Part I Different Stages of Development in Media System of Russia**

If we are to explore the media system of Russia in depth, we must first under the different stages of development in the media system of Russia in itself. There are a number of influential sayings on the historical stages of the development of the Russian media system described as follows:

The Russian scholar Ya. Zassurskii proposed different important stages of development in his works:

1. 1985-1990 – this was the stage of Glasnost, whereby the media in Russia emerged as the tool for criticizing the bureaucratic system and government departments, and for the advocacy of democracy. Yet, the media system still maintained the leadership role of the Communist Party and prompted for

top-down democratization of the Communist Party. “The Law on the Press and Other Mass Media” was successfully passed on June 12 1990. In the abortive coup of August in 1991, the Communist Party was banned from any form of activities and Communist publication materials were transferred to the hand of the new independent news media.<sup>2</sup>

2. 1991- 1995 – this was the stage recognized as the “Democratic Mechanism Development Stage” after the period of August 1991 to 1995, and was the first time that journalism as a professional establishment was attempted: “Journalism as a profession was established horizontally for withstanding the pressure of state power and appeared in the role as the opposition”.<sup>3</sup> In the period of 1991-1993, journalism in Russia experienced its “golden age”. But this was short-lived due to economic reason. Economic reform posted severe challenges to publication. As a result, publication could not make a profit or made very little profit. The government has tried to subsidize the publication with papers, but not sufficiently to keep them survive. Journalists at that point had no choice but turned to the most powerful economic mechanism at this point of time, the banks and the enterprises, for help. The result was the monopoly of most newspapers and magazines by the banks and the enterprises.<sup>4</sup> Companies close to the state or controlled by the government have indeed purchased the entire media, including a few very influential news media units like NTV, Echo Moskvi, and Izvestiy

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<sup>2</sup> Засурский Я. Н. *Искушение свободой* (М., 2004), с.221-222.

<sup>3</sup> См.: там же. С. 27.

<sup>4</sup> См.: там же. С. 222.

3. 1996-2000 – this stage unfolded from the end of the initial stage of the election campaign in 1996. Ya. Zassurskii commented this was the turning point of the media system: “The owners of big media enterprises joined together for supporting Yelsin. Once again, an authoritarian mode of journalism in Russia reemerged. At that time, the media was no longer managed by the propaganda functionaries of the Communist Party but by the businessmen. Then, the oligopoly of the media industry emerged....” Journalists were under the influences from different sources and directions. He continued, “Journalists confronted the pressure from the government and at the same time suppressed by the unrestrained business enterprises at work. At this time, the authority of journalism and the journalists were decade”.<sup>5</sup>

McNair B., a British scholar who has written a number of works on the development of the media in Russia divided the Russian media system into 3 major stages.<sup>6</sup>

1. 1986-1990 (ended on June 12 1990 after the promulgation of the “The Law on the Press and Other Mass Media”) --- the stage of Glasnost.
2. 1990 (August) – 1991(August) – the golden age of the media in Russia but lasted for just one year. It was concluded at the August coup in 1991.
3. 1991 (August) ---early 2000 – the development of media market mechanism (with negative trend in development: the rise in

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<sup>5</sup> См.: там же. С. 222-223.

<sup>6</sup> McNair B. “Media in post-Soviet Russia: an overview”, *European Journal of Communication*, Vol. 9, (1994), pp. 115-135.

prices of publication materials and the shrinking of the publication market).

Russian communication system scholar I. Zassurskii suggested that the 1<sup>st</sup> stage began in 1990 (after the promulgation of the “The Law on the Press and Other Mass Media” in Russia) and concluded in early 1992. I. Zassurskii agreed that this stage could be defined as the “golden age” although he called this the “first privatization” stage of media. The 2<sup>nd</sup> stage began with the launch of economic reforms and ended at the October Incident in 1993. The writer of this paper called this the “Political contradiction and economic hardship of media” period. The 3<sup>rd</sup> stage (1993-mid 1995) was the “political stabilization” stage. This was also the beginning of the development of centralization of capital in the media. The 4<sup>th</sup> stage (Mid 1995 to mid 1996) was the convergence of the return of the media to political capital and political capitalization and its control of public opinions. The 5<sup>th</sup> stage (mid 1996 to mid 1998), which was called the “mediatization of politics” or “Intermingle of media-politics” stage by I. Zassurskii. In the regional market, “politicized and commercialize capital” increased.<sup>7</sup>

Other influential scholars also had their classification of the stages of development for the Russian media: they were Russian journalist and media manager E. Yakovlev,<sup>8</sup> former Editor in

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<sup>7</sup> Засурский И. И. *СМИ России в условиях глобальных процессов трансформации: Формирование новой системы средств информации и их роль в политической жизни страны. 1990-1998 гг.*: Дис. Канд. Филол. Наук. (М., 1998), с. 94-95.

<sup>8</sup> См.: там же. С.62-64.

Chief of “Independence” V. Tret'yakov,<sup>9</sup> Professor M. Markeev of National Tula University,<sup>10</sup> and S. Konovchenko of Rostov University.<sup>11</sup>

The analysis of the stages of development of the media in Russia by the scholars was conducted on the basis of particular historical events, and the changes in the economic and political environment but short of any study on the policy and legislation at those stages. In this paper, the standard for classifying the stages of development proposed by A. Richter, the Director of Russian Media Law and Policy Institute, was adopted for observing objectively the media policy of Russia at different stages. Richter proposed that the development of the media in Russia was closely associated with the legislation of legal rules governing the media.<sup>12</sup>

The 1<sup>st</sup> Stage (1986-1990) --- this was the stage where journalism was liberated from party rule. The CPSU began to liberalize the standard of self-criticism, including the contributions and mistakes to the state in the past, and how socialism could engage in stable development in the future. At this stage, Russia had institutionalized certain documents for the party in managing expression in the society with the resolution of the General Session

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<sup>9</sup> См.: Третьяков В. Т. *Как стать знаменитым журналистом* (М., 2004), с.126-146.

<sup>10</sup> *СМИ в информационном взаимодействии власти и общества*. Материалы всероссийской конференции.(М., 2005), с.83-85.

<sup>11</sup> См.: Коновченко С. В. *Общество – Средства массовой информации – власть. Ч. 1.* (Ростов-на Дону, 2001), с. 89-100.

<sup>12</sup> Рихтер А. *Свобода массовой информации в постсоветских государствах: регулирование и саморегулирование журналистики в условиях переходного периода*. Диссертация на соискание ученой степени доктора филологических наук. (М., 2005), с. 70.



of the 19<sup>th</sup> CPSU “about Glastnost” (1988). In fact, the news censorship organ of former Soviet Union had ceased to perform its function in enforcing ideology and no longer enforced the rules for the punishment of “anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda”. The resolution of the party also lifted the ban on subscribing popular publications and stopped the interference of the airwaves of foreign radio broadcasting stations. The result of these measures was the skyrocketing of the media audience population.

Like old times under the Soviet rule, the resolution documents of the Soviet echelon not only defined the limits for the content of political commentary but also the appointment of related personnel (editors and other media executives were to be appointed by the politburo of the CPSU<sup>13</sup>). They also limited the scope on certain economic issues, including the pricing, the circulation volume, the allocation of profits, and the time slots for advertising. This brought about contradiction – journalists could be independent and autonomous in creation, but the editorial department could not be an independent entity economically. Under this situation, the essence of the 1<sup>st</sup> stage of media development in Russia could be taken as party documents made possible the media in criticizing the government and the freezing of the rules that restrained journalists at work.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> stage (1990-1991) ---this was the “golden age” of Russian journalism. This stage began in March 1990 where the leadership role of the CPSU as stated in Chapter VI of the Soviet

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<sup>13</sup> См.: Лацис О. “Два русских чуда: независимый суд и свободная пресса”, *Судьи и журналисты в странах Восточной Европы в период перехода к демократии*, (СПБ., 2000), с.53.

Constitution was abolished, and the influence of the CPSU in every aspect of social lives with the mass media in particular declined rapidly. On August 1 1990, the Soviet Union further instituted the “The Law on the Press and Other Mass Media”. In practice, this new law had its meaning. First of all, it entailed the abolishment of the news censorship system. Second, this law made possible the establishment of media enterprises in the private sector. Third, journalists were granted prerogative, which was specified in the new press law that journalists could fully access to government information, which otherwise would have to obtain from the Central Archive Office of the CPSU. In addition, the new law also made possible economic independence of the editorial departments of the media. The media reserved copyright to their products, the right to use and right of disposal. These were not present at the 1<sup>st</sup> stage of media development. At the same time, the government continued to subsidize the media and granted them special privileges so that media units could enter the media market with very low entrance barrier. The result was the emergence of numerous news agencies, print media and radio and television broadcasting programs in the market independent of the government and political parties. At this stage, the Russian federal law “On Mass Media” was also legislated. This law gave more freedom than the Soviet Press Law. At this stage, the unique feature was that journalism had already shaken from the yoke of control by ideology but still constrained by economic pressure from the market.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Рихтер А. *Свобода массовой информации в постсоветских государствах: регулирование и саморегулирование журналистики в условиях переходного*

The 3<sup>rd</sup> stage (1992-1995)--- Richter called this the stage of media institutionalization. He suggested that the media at that point of time had emerged as the full-range opposition of the state and fully engaged in the discussion of political, economic, and social development of the country. The radio and television broadcasting system was also engaged in de-centralization. The control of the print media under strict hierarchy in the pyramid form as was under Soviet rule also collapsed. At that time, the media economy deteriorated very quickly, and that made the media industry unprofitable.<sup>15</sup> In the political process where the media, the president, and the parliament confronted one another, the media played the role as social institution rather than a form of weapon. In the society, the public held that the media was a weapon for fighting against the state rather than a political instrument. Therefore, the new government under Yelsin provided ample funding in favor of the media in order to seek collaboration from the media. During this period, the Russian government instituted more new rules and regulations and political decisions the country ever had to create an environment for the freedom of press and the overall development of the media. Examples were the “On copyright and related Rights”, “On Advertising Law”, “On State Secrets”, order of the President of the Russian Federation “On Guaranteed Stable Supply of Information and Requirements of Television Broadcasting”(О гарантиях информационной стабильности и требованиях к телерадиовещанию). In 1993, the Constitution of the Russian Federation was legislated. This was the

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*периода.* Диссертация на соискание ученой степени доктора филологических наук. (М., 2005), с. 60.

<sup>15</sup> Там же. С. 60.

supreme law that protected the freedom of press and the prohibition of news censorship.

At the same time, the entities under the Russian Federation also started to institute their own laws for managing the operation of the media at the localities. These legal rules always provided preferential treatment in favor of the local media for development including funding, the access to and dissemination of information. The special features of the development of the journalism industry at the 3<sup>rd</sup> Stage were the protection of the media for development and independence with legal means under undue economic hardship.

The 4<sup>th</sup> Stage (1995-1999) was characterized by the interference of the media by big capitalist enterprises. Under the 2<sup>nd</sup> economic reform of privatization by the government, poverty of the public and consumption power went down. The government simply could not respond to the expectation of the people, so political apathy prevailed in society. This also reflected the lack of interest in publication of the people. At the same time, financial- industrial groups became strong under privatization.

Being politically strong but economically frail, the editorial departments began to accept investment by raising capital with financial-industrial groups. The result was “financiers got control over the print media and electronic media of Russia.”<sup>16</sup> Then, the media became “an instrument for election campaigns.”<sup>17</sup> It turned into a battlefield among the enterprises who controlled different

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<sup>16</sup> Там же. С. 61.

<sup>17</sup> Засурский Я. Н. *Искушение свободой* (М., 2004), с. 27.

media units for their own interests. This could be exemplified by the frequent changes in the government of Russia in the period of 1998 to 1999. As put forward by participants of the events and political observer, former Editor in Chief of newspaper “Nezavisimosti” V. Tret'yakov, under this strife, “Formal political parties and campaigns or political figures did not express for the materialization of their ideal or with solid evidence, they spoke for the NTV or Channel 1... propagandist groups, agitators, and organizers used television broadcasting channels as the main arena.”<sup>18</sup>

When the government realized the potential threat of the media in these few years, they abruptly attempted to stop the heavy reliance of the media on big business. As such, the “information war” and “libel war” rose. For coping with this situation, The Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes attempted to make fair judgment for ending the information war on December 31 1993. However, after the outbreak of the scandal of selling the “Svyazinvest” by the President, he invited the financial oligarchy of Russia in September 1997 specifically invited them to stop attacking and tainting one another and the Russian government. This insinuated that the government officially recognized the lines of the editorial departments of some media units in Russia are the manifestation of the interests of specific financial groups.<sup>19</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Третьяков В. Т. , “Защита от Путина (1) Когда настанет конец свободе слова в России?”, *Независимая газ.*, 6 сент. 2000.

<sup>19</sup> Подробнее об «информационных войнах» см.: Засурский И. И. , “СМИ и власть. Россия девяностых” М. И. Алексеева, Л. Д. Болотова, Е. Л. Варганова и др.; Под ред. Я. Н. Засурского., *Средства массовой информации России: Учеб. Пособие для студентов вузов* (М., 2005), с.

Legal rules governing elections specifically restrained the participation of journalists and the media in elections. During this period, the number of government officials who laid legal charges against the media for protecting their own reputation almost doubled.<sup>20</sup> The primary function for the control of the media turned into an administrative hand whereby the government allowed federal agencies wide latitude in decision-making of related disputes. To this end, the government suspended the legislation of additional legal rules at the federal level in favor of the media. There were many cases that exemplified this policy, including the top level of government hindered the legislation of the “Television Broadcasting Law”. In the same token, government television stations and other media resources were integrated into the Russian State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company(1998). In 1999, a government-controlled media agency was established: “Ministry of Press, Broadcasting and Mass Communications”.

People lost interest in politics, which gave rise to the booming yellow publication and commercialized television programs. British scholar McNair, B. criticized such phenomenon in 1990 as the side effect of “Glasnost” by Gorbachev – in the wake of the rise of commercial publication materials, yellow journalism emerged in

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78-124. См. также: Почепцов Г. Г. , *Информационные войны* (Москва-Киев, 2001). Третьяков В. Т., *Как стать знаменитым журналистом* (М., 2004), с. 482-572.; Панарин И. Н., *Информационная война и власть* (М., 2001), с. 124-126.

<sup>20</sup> См.: Потапенко С. В., *Судебная защита от диффамации в СМИ: Монография* (Краснодар, 2002), с.96.

Russia.<sup>21</sup> This is particularly the case in television broadcasting. Programs tainted with violence and sex flooded the broadcasting channels. This would not have happened during Soviet rule, and infuriated the public. It was at this juncture that an attempted solution for this problem emerged. The abortive legislation of “On maintaining social ethics by the government and additional effort for the control of the sales of pornographic products” in the Duma was an obvious example. At the same time, local government also attempted to make laws for protecting social ethics. As mentioned, the core essence of laws in this period was the intensified control of media activities and freedom of press at the federal level. This period was also characterized by the active participation of the journalists in the “information war” and the declining trust of the society in the media.

The 5<sup>th</sup> Stage (from 2000 onward) --- this stage was characterized by “the state took its offensive” through suppressing the media owners who intended to exercise influence on the government. In the information war of the Duma election, military intervention into Chechnya and the presidential election, Kremlin first targeted at V. Gusinsky, and then B. Berezovsky. The government policy on the media could be exemplified by Doctrine of the Information Security instituted in 2000.<sup>22</sup> For checking the “Russian Journalists Association”, an organization that supported V. Gusinsky, the government established the pro-government “Federation of Media”, followed by the establishment of the

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<sup>21</sup> См.: McNair B., *Glasnost, Perestroika and the Soviet Media* (London, 1991), p.203.

<sup>22</sup> “Доктрина информационной безопасности”, *Российская Газ.*, 29 сент. 2000.

“Industry Commission” organized by the media managers and owners.

Laws like “The Anti-extremism Law”, “On the Fight Against Terrorism”, “On the State of Emergency” and related rules legislated in this period posed significant threats against the freedom of press in Russia. In reality, the threat to the freedom of press could be proved by the prior approval by the government on any media broadcasting and report. For example, when Kremlin faced conflict or disaster, the executive arm of the President would directly notify all national television channels telling them how to broadcast.

Indeed, the Russian state attempted to slowly but surely deprive the media of their immunity from administrative intervention. The cooling relation between the media and the government could be demonstrated by the conflict with “1<sup>st</sup> Channel”, “NTV”, “Television Channel 6”, and “Moscow Central Television Station”. To destroy the media empire of V. Gusinsky and B. Berezovsky, the government mainly took advantage of their financial disputes. At the same time, the government also refused to grant other media units the same kind of funding. Instead, the government granted them political preferences, funding and government purchase orders.

In sum, the 5<sup>th</sup> Stage of development of the journalism industry in Russia could be characterized as the intensification of restraints over the freedom of press. At the same time, mass communications had lost its role in the social system through a



number of indicators and turned into regular business entities. Also, journalists had their space for political commentary reduced.

### **The Characteristics and Trend of Media Development from 2000 to 2008**

From 2000 to present, the reinforcement of control over the media by the President and the Russian government continued mainly through the means for prompting the media to act in the interest of the government and made in the interest of the people. This could be demonstrated by the legislation of the government for the control of the media economically, ideologically and politically. The government had won the superior position in the elections of the Duma in 1999 and 2003. Therefore, there was no reason for the government to contend with the Duma anymore. At that time, the Kremlin had the fewest contestants it ever had in the history of the Soviet Union and Russia. This also implied that the government no longer needed to grant privileges in favor of the media. At that time, the people turned their political apathy to antagonism towards the media. The society generally demonstrated its grievances of the media, which provided a stronger base for the legislative and executive power for further action in stripping off freedom of the press, and economic preferential treatment previously in favor of the media. In August 2004, the Federal Law “Amendment to and addition to “The General Principle for Legislation of the Russian Legislative and Administrative Entities” and the “Common Principle for Regional Organization of the

Russian Federation” were in place.<sup>23</sup> From 2005 onward, the “The Law for funding mass media and books” and “Economic Supports for Local Newspapers” were annulled. At the same time, the federal law “On Mass Media” was also amended, thereby the right of the federal entity in legislation of legal rules governing the media was revoked. As a result, local governments granted television broadcasting companies and publications in their localities economic and other preferential treatments to control the freedom of expression.

After 2003, the oil price skyrocketed without pause. The Russian economy recovered and reduced its reliance on the West. As such, Russia could no longer care about how other countries treated themselves, including the opinions on the status of the freedom of press in Russia. Kremlin started to comply with the “Information Security Principle” (Доктрина информационной безопасности) whereby the interest of the state (the government) under current information policy was explicitly stated.

This was the “Information Security Principle” instituted by the Security Council of the Russian Federation in June 23 2000. On September 9 the same year, Putin signed to approve this new rule

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<sup>23</sup> Федеральный закон от 22.08.2004, № 122-ФЗ, «О внесении изменений в законодательные акты Российской Федерации и признании утратившими силу некоторых законодательных актов Российской Федерации в связи с принятием Федеральных законов «О внесении изменений и дополнений в Федеральный закон «Об общих принципах организации законодательных (представительных) и исполнительных органов государственной власти субъектов Российской Федерации» и «Об общих принципах организации местного самоуправления в Российской Федерации»//Собрание законодательства РФ. 2004. 30 авг. № 35. Ст. 3607.»

to come into full force.<sup>24</sup> This document covered a wide array of matters, from the development of state-owned electronic media to the concluding section of intellectual property right. There was one concept linking the documents: how to increase the power of the government over the control of the media on legal ground. In name, the law included the prohibition of censorship and the principle for preserving the freedom of press. However, provisions contradicting such principle could also be found in the document.

First of all, the government had made its principle in the power for the control of information very clear. Individuals are protected in their rights to access and use information on condition that the precondition of “protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia, political, economic and social stability, law and order, and the development of international cooperation under equity and mutual benefit”. The government also made it clear that Russia was under the threat of the media including the use of media to restrain the freedom of individual thoughts and disseminate propaganda on populist culture, which is based on violence and other values in defiance of traditional Russian social value, and the abusive use of the freedom of press by the media. They also suggested that the Russians were confronted by a high external threat including foreign institutions, international terrorist groups, and other organized crime and groups. These jeopardized the interest of the Russian Federal Government in the domain of information, and would eventually wither the influence of the government in social life, and hence the protection of the economic

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<sup>24</sup> “Доктрина информационной безопасности”, *Российская Газ.*, 29 сент. 2000.

benefit of the people under law by the government. At the same time, “the broadcasting of foreign information agencies also reinforced the reliance of the Russian on foreign culture, economics and politics.”

The Kremlin became less reliant on the media oligarchy. With the departure of Yelsin from the scene, they became the targets of attack by the Kremlin. In delivering public speeches, Putin put B. Berezovsky and V. Gusinsky as the manipulators of public opinions, and said that they attempted to stir up political crisis in the country.<sup>25</sup> Finally, the Kremlin made the considerably influential Media Group “Media-Most” of V. Gusinsky vanish, and also left B. Berezovsky no choice but selling his media assets. In addition, the Ministry of Press, Broadcasting and Mass Communication suddenly decided to refer the license previously owned by Moscow Television Station to public auction in 2000, which made the media units antagonistic towards Kremlin to restrain. In 2005, the “Prof-Media” Group of Potanin was compelled to sell its widely circulated national newspaper, the “Izvestiya” to the pro-government gas industry group. Other oligarchies were too cautious in the domain of media and information in order to persuade the government officials and the legislators if it was necessary, so that legal rules and resolutions favorable to them could be passed.

The government played an absolute role in the process of managing the media. Although there were frequent changes in the government from March to May in 2004 – the Ministry of Press,

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<sup>25</sup> См.: “Экология и права человека”, *Бюллетень ECO-HR*, 2 сент. 2000.

Broadcasting and Mass Communication was renamed as Ministry of Culture and Mass Communication. The previous strict control of the media by former Minister Mihail Lesin seemed to be weakened, but the administrative body of the government still played a vital and positive role in this domain. This could be demonstrated in the issuance of radio broadcasting license and the extensive official warnings issued against the media in the first place. Approximately half a year after the establishment of Ministry of Culture and Mass Communication, this government agency had issued 18 official warnings. The frequency was the same as before. Evidence also showed that the role of the state in the media remained unchanged, including the The Judicial Chamber for Information Disputes that was abolished in 2000.<sup>26</sup> In the past, the Judicial Chamber was situated at the center of state power, but it was never subordinated to the Kremlin, and never made judgment on different forms of media disputes in the name of political legitimacy. Instead, it adopted cases in international ruling and media ethics in making judgments.

In describing the development of the media in current period, Ya. Zassurskii saw “Nationalization” (этатизм) as the foremost threat to the freedom of press in Russia, and the reinforcement of government influence on the media: “Measures for the nationalization of the media not only destroyed the essence of the freedom of press, but also turned the media into an instrument of the government...Finally, nationalization policy scorned the

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<sup>26</sup> Рихтер А. *Свобода массовой информации в постсоветских государствах: регулирование и саморегулирование журналистики в условиях переходного периода*. Диссертация на соискание ученой степени доктора филологических наук. (М. 2005), с. 70.

responsibility and concept of the freedom of press and made obstacles to the free circulation of information and public society.”<sup>27</sup>

Professor E. Vartanova suggested that this feature of “nationalization” could be explained in terms of the features of “Eurasian Media” proposed by De Smaele. The characteristics of Oriental (or Asian) cultural traits in Russian society molded the Russian media system as neither occidental nor oriental. At the same time, it also entailed the traits of “Asia”. There was a strong belief inherent to the “Eurasia Media”. Whether it is consciously or unconsciously done, the control of the state is vital, including the traditional negligence of market orientation, and the deep-rooted concept of the intervention of the state into the media. At the same time, “patronism” was the core concept in “Eurasian Media”. Further, “Eurasian Media” has always been depicted as the conflicts of interest under multilateral ethical norms, beliefs and cultures in the process of modernization, and the paternalistic stance of the state in facing journalists and the audiences.<sup>28</sup>

## **Part II Theories of Western scholars on media system**

Key indicator for the theories of media system was the scholastic work of F. Siebert, T. Peterson, and W. Schramm, the

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<sup>27</sup> Засурский Я. Н. *Искушение свободой* (М., 2004.) С. 97.

<sup>28</sup> Vartanova, E. (2007). “Russian media economy: eurasion model”, pp. 103-121. Vartanova, E. (ed.). *Media and Change*. Moscow: MediaMir. P.110.

“Four Theories of the Press”.<sup>29</sup> In this book, four types of media theories were described: the Libertarian, the Social Responsibility Theory, the Authoritarian Theory, and the Soviet Communist Theory.

The writer of this paper holds that it is necessary to observe the social system in which the media operated in, in order to understand the variations among individual media systems. For understanding the real relation between the media and the social system, we must understand the fundamental belief and assumption prevailing in the society: the essence of human beings, the essence of society and the state, the relation between the people and the state, and the essence of knowledge and truth.<sup>30</sup> At the same time, they also explained the Soviet Communist Theory was but the development of the ancient authoritarian theory. Social responsibility theory is the revision of liberalism. Therefore, there was critique that the four theories as mentioned were but one theory, which was liberalism. Or, they might be taken as two types of theories, liberalism and authoritarianism.<sup>31</sup>

“Four Theories of the Press” was published during the cold war between the USA and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the principal manifestation of the book was whether or not the government should take control of the media. This was particularly the case so far as the liberalism theory was concerned. The social

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<sup>29</sup> Siebert, Fredrick S, Theodore Peterson, & Wilbur Schramm, *Four theories of the press* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956).

<sup>30</sup> Siebert, Fredrick S, Theodore Peterson, & Wilbur Schramm. *Four theories of the press* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956), p.2.

<sup>31</sup> McQuail, Denis. *McQuail's mass communication Theory* (London, Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 2002), p.200.

responsibility theory was proposed as a supplement to liberalism, but the details of the theory triggered much controversy. At the same time, a number of scholars had proposed revision and supplements to the said theories. R. Lowenstein and J. Merrill were two scholars who had queried the “four types of theories” the most in the 1970s. R. Lowenstein suggested that the four theories were not applicable to Kenya, Egypt, Myanmar, and other developing countries. The four theories also could not explain the flexibility and exception of media systems in many countries of the world. In 1983, scholar Denis McQuail suggested that the four theories simply could not be universally applicable because they could not be applied to developing countries. As such, McQuail proposed the “Democratic-participation Theory” and “Development Media Theory”.<sup>32</sup> In 1987, American scholar William Hachten expanded the four theories into five media theories.<sup>33</sup> The content of the models proposed by Hachten resembled the essence of the four theories. The cold war between the USA and the Soviet Union started at the end of WWII. In the 1980, Gorbachev launched his Perestroika that prompted the collapse of the communist countries in Eastern Europe. The cold war ended formally at the beginning of 1990s when the Soviet Union disintegrated. The end of the cold war did not bring an end to the discussion of the types of media. In 1997, Finnish scholar Kaarle Nordenstreng proposed 5 models in the study of media.

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<sup>32</sup> McQuail, Denis . *Mass communication theory: an introduction* (London, Thousand Oaks: SAGE, 1994).

<sup>33</sup> William A. Hachten. *The world news prism: changing media for international communication* (5<sup>th</sup> Edition). (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1987), pp.14-31.



In “De-Westernizing Media Studies” edited by British scholar James Curran and Korean scholar Myung-Jin Park, wide scope comparison had been made on the societies of different countries, and analyzed the development of the media under the political and economic background. This book was a collection of 22 papers covering the media systems in Asia, Africa, and Latin America observing the media systems of the worlds from two perspectives: democratic vs. authoritarian, neo liberalism vs. regulated media theories. These provided us a coordinate with 4 quadrants. Here, democratic countries and authoritarian countries were operated under the neo liberalism or regulated media system. Basing on these, they proposed “Five Types of Theories”: democratic/neo liberal media theory (Japan, USA, UK, Australia), democratic/regulated media theory (Sweden, Italy, South Africa, India, Israel, France), authoritarian/ neo liberalism media theory (Mexico, Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia), and authoritarian/regulated media theory (Zimbabwe, Egypt). The fifth type of theory was the transitional and mixed media theory including China, Eastern Europe, South America, Middle East, and Russia.<sup>34</sup>

After the publication of the book by Curran and Park, American scholar Daniel C. Hallin and Italian scholar Paolo Macini published the “Comparing Media Systems” in 2004. In the book, they compared the media systems in different countries. Further to the analysis of the systems, they showed their concerned of the symbiotic relation between politics and the media, and proposed possible trend of development of the media systems from the

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<sup>34</sup> James Curran & Myung-Jin Park (Eds.), *De-westernizing media studies* (London: Routledge, 2000).

perspective of history. Paolo Mancini, one of the authors of the book, had visited Moscow and shared the interchanges with Russian scholars. Their concepts attracted much attention and discussion in Russia. The two scholars suggested four dimensions for comparing media systems: the strong or weak development of a mass circulation press, degree of political parallelism, the degree of journalistic professionalism, the degree and nature of state intervention in the media system. They also suggested that the attributes of political system were factors critical for the comparison of media systems including: the role of the state in the society; the consensus or majoritarian characteristics of the political system; the pattern of interest group organization, including the distinction between more fragmented liberal and more corporatist systems; the distinction between moderate and polarized pluralism; the development of rational-legal authority in contrast to clientelist forms of social organization. They further classified the media systems of the West into 3 types with reference to geopolitics and individual attributes:<sup>35</sup> the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist model, Northern/central Europe or Democratic Corporatist model, North Atlantic or Liberal model.

Countries fell into the categories of the four theories proposed by Curran and Park could easily be classified. However, the transitional and mixed media theory could not be easily classified since they are transforming and mixed. As suggested by Jan Ekecrantz, what direction would such transforming media systems move in the four quadrants? Eight years after the publication of this

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<sup>35</sup> Daniel C. Hallin & Paolo Mancini, *Comparing media systems: three models of media and politics* (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

book, how far the media systems of these countries have advanced?<sup>36</sup> The directions of transformations of these countries largely relied on their domestic political and economic development and such development at global level. The media systems in the contemporary world turned complex, which added complexities to the analysis of the media systems. Daniel C. Hallin and Paolo Mancini suggested that the development of the media systems in Russia or Eastern Europe resembled the Mediterranean Model. Yet, the history of media development in Russia and the Mediterranean was different and development took place in different stages. The writer of this paper thus emphasized that readers should not take this as the standard model for analysis because a country that completely fit into the models simply does not exist.

In this paper, the writer suggested that no model proposed by the aforementioned scholars in the West could give an exact picture of the media system in contemporary Russia. As mentioned by Ya. Zassurskii, “The media system in Russia underwent different stages of transformation not just because the country transformed into democratic system and market economy, but also because the country was also in the process of the transformation of global mass media. Media systems all over the world were in the process of transforming into new and complex media systems<sup>37</sup>”. Professor

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<sup>36</sup> Ekecrantz, J. “Post-Post-Communist Media? A Challenge for Comparative Media Studies”, in Vartanova, E. ed., *Media and Change* (Moscow: MediaMir, 2007), p.87.

<sup>37</sup> Zassoursky Y. N., “Changing Media and Communications”, in Y. Zassoursky and E. Vartanova eds., *Changing Media and Communications. Concepts, Technologies and Ethics in Global and National Perspectives* (Moscow, 1998), P.19.

E. Vartanova also held that the mode of development the Russian media system featured a mixture of attributes, “For Russia, the mode of mixed attributes included the social economic problems unique to the country and was related to the advancement of globalization of information technology. At the same time, it was closely associated with the history of traditional Russian ideology, culture and world view.”<sup>38</sup> Therefore, the Russian media system was a mixture of different models that could not be put into specific model for discussion as wished.

### **Part III The Russian Media System Model**

Media development in the post-Soviet period could be divided into different stages as analyzed in preceding section of this paper. Ya. Zassurskii combined the stages of media development and the models of development of the journalism industry in his work. Different stages of development tended to correspond to relevant models of development. Yet, one stage was indeed the continuation of preceding stage. Subsequent stages of development still carried the characteristics of preceding stage in whole or in part. The emergence of new system did not imply the vanishing of the old system. The new system also featured the characteristics of the old system and was indeed the improvement of the old system. This could be exemplified by the study of the media systems of different

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<sup>38</sup> Вартанова Е. Л. “Современная медиаструктура”, Я. Н. Засурский ред., *Средства Массовой Информации Постсоветской России* (М., 2002), с.18.

countries contemporarily. No system was homogenous or unique but featured different models in the course of development.

There was no unique essence or philosophy inherent to any media system. Each of such systems may consist of numerous essence or philosophies affecting one another. They were always not consistent and contained complementary elements for the system. We could see this in the literature of contemporary theories of media systems. The models for media not only provided definite classification system for the media but also allowed media units to demonstrate their typical interrelation with that between the media and the state in particular. This paper holds that “Modelization” is an attempt to assign an ideal model but not the manifestation of the reality in the practice of journalism.

In the past, scholars criticized the four theories and suggested that contemporary media could not be simplified into the four basic models. In addition, the media system is a part of the philosophy in contemporary society and not a matter of linear mean-end consequence relation.<sup>39</sup> In fact, the media model adopted in one country may feature the essence of different models of media theories. If we look at the course of development of the Russian media and the models it adopted, we see that some of such models had already vanished over time. However, the vanished models had their effect on models subsequently emerged.

The 1<sup>st</sup> model is the “Tool-Tradition” model proposed by Ya. Zassurskii. This was proposed during the post-Soviet era (the time

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<sup>39</sup> Siebert, Fredrick S., Theodore Peterson, & Wilbur Schramm. *Four theories of the press* (Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1956).

of Gorbachev) under authoritarianism background. The media was previously the tool of the state in propaganda, but turned into a tool for top-down revolution. This accelerated the moving from the closed-end Soviet government to an open and democratic society, and differentiated from the Soviet communist model.<sup>40</sup>

The right of the journalists in access to power had been fully inflated because this had already been realized in the top-down vertical media system. “Such system included the limitation and struggle in specific and the selection of information and news. The media had the right to disclose corruption and the incompetence of the government agencies, but not all journalists were permitted to investigate such crimes. Openness had once been an excellent ideal but turned into an uncontroversial formality for access to information. It was no longer an ideal for public access to any type of information.”<sup>41</sup>

The “Tool-Tradition” model replaced the form of absolutism during the years of Soviet communism. The form of absolutism prohibited any form of expression in the media that was not recognized under the goal of socialism. It would be more appropriate to say that the degree of the freedom of press was determined by the state rather than by law (the body of Soviet laws still existed but was frozen). The essence of the model at the 1<sup>st</sup> stage could be characterized as the specific transformation from absolutist model of media to democratic form of media. However,

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<sup>40</sup> Засурский Я. Н. “СМИ в современной структуре российского общества”, М.И. Алексеева, Л. Д. Болотова, Е.Л. Варганова и др.; Я. Н. Засурский ред., *Средства Массовой Информации России: Учеб. Пособие для Студентов Вузов* ( М., 2005), с.9.

<sup>41</sup> Засурский Я. Н. *Искушение свободой.* (М., 2004), с. 64.

this new model still operated under the old Soviet system and there was no real freedom of press.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> model was called the “Fourth Power” by Ya. Zassurskii. In the period of 1991 to 1993, the journalism industry was in its “golden age”. Journalism was no longer the mouthpiece of the government but undergoing de-politicization to its entirety and was independent of the government. A “new media culture” emerged. “The media persistently gained independence from the government, and played the role of opposition against the government and the Duma.”<sup>42</sup> This model was, without doubt, the product of the “The Law on the Press and Other Mass Media” under Soviet rule. As mentioned by M. Shkondin, the media model of the “Fourth Power” “protected the free participation of public media of the society with political power and not just helping the public to speak out the issues and opinions forged by politics and reality. At the same time, it also participated in the control of the actions of the state functionaries.”<sup>43</sup>

However, Richter suggested that when mass media moved towards a civil society in full effort, it should not turned into the master of the movement. It was entitled to the role of the “Fourth Power” because it expressed the opinions of the whole society or the “Fourth Power” would replace a civil society. Such replacement occurred when the public media not only provided information and formed public opinions, but also attempted to control public

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<sup>42</sup> Там же. С.36.

<sup>43</sup> Шкондин М. В. “Системные характеристики СМИ”, М.И. Алексеева, Л. Д. Болотова, Е.Л. Вартанова и др.; Я. Н. Засурский ред., *Средства Массовой Информации России: Учеб. Пособие для Студентов Вузов* (М., 2005), с.9.

opinions. As compared with other three powers of the state (legislative, executive, and judicial), the media had no theoretical and actual foundation. The media was not political entity and was not the direct participant of acquiring or protecting the state authority. The major difference between the media and the conditions of contemporary state power was that there was no buy-sell relation.<sup>44</sup>

From the control under the communist party, to liberation, privatization of assets, freedom of economic activities, media in Russia, obviously missed one important goal – democratic participation. As such, the Russian media under the early stage of the “Fourth Power” model simply lacked a mature civil society as the foundation. In early 1990, the Russian society eagerly welcomed the mass media and took it as the symbol for more freedom and better life. In fact, this was just one dream replacing another. As explicitly stated by McNair on the state of the Russian society after the reconstruction, “this form of transforming from one Utopian ideal to another political belief was wrong... the result was a chaotic form of capitalism.”<sup>45</sup>

The market reforms in early 1990 did create economic hardship to the journalism industry. Media groups had no choice but turn to the newly emerged banks and enterprises for assistance.

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<sup>44</sup> Рихтер А. *Свобода массовой информации в постсоветских государствах: регулирование и саморегулирование журналистики в условиях переходного периода*. Диссертация на соискание ученой степени доктора филологических наук. (М., 2005), с. 75.

<sup>45</sup> McNair, B. “Power, Profit, Corruption, and Lies. The Russian Media in the 1990s”, in Curran, J., Park M.-J. eds., *De-Westernizing Media Studies* (London/NY: Routledge, 2000), p. 82.



The result was the control of important media units by banks and enterprises. These “media-industrial complex” organized by financial and industrial tycoons used their ownership of the media to exercise paramount influence over media policy<sup>46</sup>. Obviously, they played a pivotal role in the making of media policy under the new media environment. The media was once again politicized and changed into a tool for political propaganda and manipulation. There were numerous big media groups and enterprises emerged in the society including government-owned and private media groups. In 1997, Ya. Zassurskii suggested that “although this model did not follow the track of the Soviet bureaucratic administrative system, but it looked very alike.”<sup>47</sup> At that point, the media of Russia was more and more vulnerable to the control of industrial groups and families that owned the media and financial resources. As such, the “information war” broke out among the media oligarchies and between the oligarchies and the government. This was the core content of the model “New Authoritarian-Financial Groups”.

Richter suggested that there was also a branch model “Media Hierarchy” (Медиакратия), which appeared in the Russian national television stations in the period of 1995 to 2000. Each Russian national television channel could pursued independent national information policy from specific angle with specific evidence. Such feature could be concluded as a mixture of “New authoritarian-financial groups” and the “Fourth Power”.

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<sup>46</sup> Vartanova, E. “Russian Media Economy: Eurasian Model”, in Vartanova, E. ed., *Media and Change* (Moscow: MediaMir, 2007), p.106.

<sup>47</sup> Засурский Я. Н. *Искушение свободой*. (М., 2004), с. 37.

I. Zassurskii held that “At that point of time, state function and political party function were unstable and not in place. Therefore, television channels influenced the audiences – which formed the main outlook of the political system. When contemporary political figures complained that Russia lacked a civilized political party system, they omitted that the real political party is the television channel. With the assistance of television, a number of political foul plays broke out and a special privileged class was created in the political arena. Such position turned into the brands of political parties and political campaigns after the election whereby the voters were recommended to cast their vote to particular candidate.”<sup>48</sup>

The information policies of the television channels were pursued like the repertoire of political plays. Information wars of this kind resembled the same mode of development: started as the disclosure of libel news under synonym, followed by the circulation of such information over the media, and concluded with the transfer or reshuffle of the government officials. At that time, “personal image propaganda” and “political purchase order” appeared. Influential masters of ceremony in television channels gave up the meager form of professional ethics. They did not even conceal their will to execute the ideas of certain oligarchy.<sup>49</sup>

Finally, when media owners attempted to exert full control over the media, some journalists stood up and resisted. At the same

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<sup>48</sup> Засурский И. И. “СМИ и власть. Россия девяностых”, М. И. Алексеева, Л. Д. Болотова, Е.Л. Варганова и др.; Я. Н. Засурский ред., *Средства Массовой Информации России: Учеб. Пособие для Студентов Вузов* (М., 2005), с. 89-90.

<sup>49</sup> Качаева А. Г. Электронные СМИ. Там же. С. 306.

time, the media model subordinated to the media groups and independent of the groups existed simultaneously. This model of media was also independent of government control, and a fourth type of model emerged – the “Independent News Media.”<sup>50</sup>

The formation of the 5<sup>th</sup> model – “Federal State-Controlled” --- this model was formed after Russian President Putin had proposed the idea of fortifying the state media<sup>51</sup>. After the integration of state media, the government strengthened its monitoring on news activities.

At the same time, regional authorities of Russia were making efforts to turn the mass media into their private-controlled domain and the 6<sup>th</sup> model, “Regional Government-Controlled” was formed.

Other scholars defined the media models of Russia differently, including the definition proposed by Kornovchenko, a scholar who studied the transformation of the Russian media in the period of 1985 to 2000. She suggested that the Russian media in that period changed from “an instrument of the Communist Party” to “the instrument of the capitalists”. From 2000 onwards, the media

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<sup>50</sup> Засурский Я. Н., “Закономерности и тенденции развития журналистики в переходный период”, *Журналистика в переходный период: проблемы и перспективы*. Материалы международной научной конференции (Москва, 23-25 октября 1997 года). См. Тж. Засурский Я. Н.. “СМИ в современной структуре российского общества”, М. И. Алексеева, Л. Д. Болотова, Е. Л. Варганова и др.; Я. Н. Засурский. ред., *Средства Массовой Информации России: Учеб. Пособие для Студентов Вузов* (М., 2005), с. 10.

<sup>51</sup> См.: Засурский Я. Н. СМИ в современной структуре российского общества. Там же. С.10.

transformed into “the tool of the government” as the “Doctrine of the Information Security” was instituted.<sup>52</sup>

Ya. Zassurskii suggested that the media model did not stop at the position of “government-controlled model” but as another form. The 7<sup>th</sup> model – “The Commercialized Media Model”, is the media that integrated massive volume of non-political, public, low-brow, yellow news. The reason was that such media drew high income.<sup>53</sup> Another Russian researcher O. Voronova suggested that this model was just like the scandal-sensational media, but could also include entertainment, Q&A, consultative media.<sup>54</sup> Richter suggested that of the media models proposed by Russian scholars (Tool-Tradition, The Fourth Power, New Authoritarian-Financial Groups, Independent News Media, Federal State-Controlled Media, Regional Government-Controlled media, and Commercialized Media), there could be another one, the “Media Hierarchy” model. This model was the new breed under the hybrid of “The Fourth Power”, and “New Authoritarian-Financial Groups”. Currently, the Russian media model features the crossbreed among Independent News Media, Federal State-Controlled Media, Regional Government-Controlled media, and Commercialized Media.

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<sup>52</sup> Коновченко С. В., *Общество-средство массовой информации – власть*. Ч. 1. (Ростов-на-Дону, 2001), с. 100.

<sup>53</sup> См.: Засурский Я. Н. “СМИ в современной структуре российского общества”, М. И. Алексеева, Л. Д. Болотова, Е. Л. Варганова и др.; Я. Н. Засурский ред., *Средства Массовой Информации России: Учеб. Пособие для Студентов Вузов* (М., 2005), с. 11.

<sup>54</sup> См.: Воронова О. А. Областные и местные газеты. Там же. С. 254.

## **Part IV Conclusion**

The Russian media system has undergone significant changes in the last decade. There should be no doubt that at the beginning of the reforms, Russia imitated the experience of the West in development and many economic models practiced in the West – introduction of business orientation logic into media operation, the growth of advertising, liberalization of radio broadcasting media, and the privatization of the print media – they even did not engage in much internal discussion and suitability but just apply the model directly. Many scholars emphasized that the liberal models of media practiced in the West influenced Russia significantly, albeit the society was anxious about the applicability of such things in the Russian society during the post-Soviet era. Gross adopted the concept of “resemblance”. In formulating this concept, Gross added the idea of “superficial” resemblance. He suggested that the media laws of Eastern Europe looked similar to that in the West, but they were entirely different in implementation and interpretation.<sup>55</sup>

After the ideal of materialization during the transformation period perished, many previous socialist countries began to give up their mechanical replication of media operation in the West and their policies. At the same time, they rethought the overall environment the countries confronted and considered their own media tradition and culture. For many countries, the successful implementation of the Western models could still be seen as the standards of advancement of the media systems in those countries.

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<sup>55</sup> Gross, P. “Between reality and dream: eastern european media transition, transformation, consolidation and intergration”, *East European Politics and Societies*, Vol.18, No.1 (2004), pp. 112&119.

But in practice, it was impossible for them not to consider the situations in different countries, and the effect on the development of the media systems when introducing the said Western models. Jakubowicz once emphasized that “subjective factors” (elements of social consciousness and culture) did play a crucial role in the transformation of the media system, and formed a vital part in the transformation of the media systems in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>56</sup>

Yet, factors that prompted the transformation of the media in Russia as proposed by scholars were equally important. As suggested by McQuail, the media is the center under the influence of the pressure from the overlapping of economic, political, and technological factors.<sup>57</sup> Further to these pressures, Curran and Seaton added “culture” as another factor. They emphasized the role of national traditions, the public, and the society.<sup>58</sup> In addition, the combination of the marketization force and competition for interest and monopoly were also suggested as vital factors that prompted the transformation of the media. In many countries, media policy is sensitive to the pressure from the big media groups, to the extent that policy decision-maker must position the media policy oriented towards the framework of the market.<sup>59</sup> In recent years, new

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<sup>56</sup> Jakubowicz, K. “Ideas in our heads. Introduction of PSB as part of media system change in central and eastern europe”. *European Journal of Communication*, Vol. 19, No.1(2004), p.54.

<sup>57</sup> McQuail, D. *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*. 5<sup>th</sup> Edition. (London: Sage, 2005), p.220.

<sup>58</sup> Curran, J., Seaton J. Power without Responsibility. *The Press and Broadcasting in Britain*. 5<sup>th</sup> Edition. (London/NY: Routledge, 1997).

<sup>59</sup> Dolce, G. Media Ownership. *The Economics and Politics of Convergence and Concentration in the UK and European Media* (London: Sage, 2002), pp.91-95, 102.

communication technologies were also interpreted as playing a vital role in pursuing the goal of media policy. This factor not only provided a specific framework for media activities, but also set the new rules for the implementation, content of media, and the relation with the audiences, and economic situations.<sup>60</sup>

Under the influence of these factors, the contemporary media system in Russia is chaotic and not unified. The dichotomization of freedom and no freedom in the former Soviet Union was no longer applicable. Western literature on the new media system still could not clearly explain the state of current Russian media system and the characteristics. This paper holds that the history of media development in Russia significantly affected the formation of the system at current stage. Ya. Zassurskii mingled the stages of media development and different models of media development in Russia in his work. One unique feature of the media system in Russia was that the development at various stage corresponded to different models. One stage was the continuation of preceding stage and subsequent stage carried the characteristics of preceding stage in whole or in part. This paper started from here and showed how Russian scholars defined the stages of media development in order to analyze the legal rules applicable to each stage of development, and concluded the models relevant with the Russian media system as follows:

The 1<sup>st</sup> model is the “Tool-Tradition” model. It appeared during the post-Soviet era (the Gorbachev Era) that media went public and turned into a tool of revolution from above. This

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<sup>60</sup> McQuail, D. *McQuail's Mass Communication Theory*. 5<sup>th</sup> Edition. (London: Sage, 2005), p.220.

prompted the closed-end Soviet government transform to an open civil society, and differentiated from the communist model under Soviet rule with absolute power. However, this model still operated under the Soviet traditional system and there was no real freedom of press.

The 2<sup>nd</sup> model was the “Fourth Power” model, which lasted from 1991 to 1992 and was called the “Golden Age” model by scholars. Then, journalism as an industry was no longer the mouthpiece of the government but an independent entity that monitored the state.

The 3<sup>rd</sup> model was the “New Authoritarian- Financial groups” model, which lasted from 1993 to mid 1995. This was the period of “political stability” and was also be beginning of the centralization of media capital. In that period, media of Russia tended to be conditioned and controlled by financial and industrial groups that owned media units. The “information war” among the media cartels and between the oligarchies and the governments broke out. This phenomenon characterized the content of the model in this period.

The 4<sup>th</sup> model, which was the hybrid of the “New Authoritarian-Financial Groups” and “the Fourth Power” of the past, came out as the “Media Hierarchy” model. This model lasted from 1995 to 2000 and was demonstrated by the Russian television.

The 5<sup>th</sup> model was the “Independent News Media” Model, which remained independent of government control at the time that all media owners attempted to control the media in whole.



The 6<sup>th</sup> model was the “Federal State-Controlled Media” model – which was formed after Russian President Putin proposed the idea of fortifying the national media. By then, national communication resources were integrated and monitoring on all news activities intensified.

The 7<sup>th</sup> model was the “Regional Government-Controlled Media” model.

The 8<sup>th</sup> model was the “Commercialized Media” model, which integrated massive volume of non-political, public and low-brow, and yellow media.

The aforementioned models of “Tool-Tradition”, “Fourth Power”, “New Authoritarian-Financial groups”, and “Media Hierarchy” had become history as the media developed. This paper define the media in current Russia is a crossbreed of the Independent News Media, the Federal State-Controlled Media, the Regional Government-Controlled Media, the Commercialized Media model .

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## 俄羅斯傳播體系探究

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邱瑞惠\*

### 摘要

在不到二十年的時間之內，隨著社會政治經濟系統和機制的崩解，俄羅斯媒體系統與制度急遽地轉變。過去對於蘇聯共產國家自由或不自由二分法的概念不再適用，而在新近媒體理論也未能完整描述俄羅斯媒體制度的現況和特性。如何了解今天的俄羅斯媒體系統？在這近二十年當中，它在不同的社會政治環境中經歷了哪些轉變？該如何去定義它目前的媒體政策和制度？為釐清以上的問題，本文分析俄國在改革開放以來所經歷的各個階段，以及其中媒體系統的變遷。俄國媒體制度的獨特處在於，不同的演變階段和不同的模式是相對應的，但在階段之間是有連續性的，每個隨後的階段還保留了上一階段的部份或全部特徵。本研究回顧重要俄羅斯學者對媒體發展階段的界定，並分析在各階段中的法規政策制定，以歸結出俄國媒體制度的相應模式。

**關鍵字：**媒體系統、媒體理論、媒體發展階段、俄羅斯

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