

# **Trust, Job Selection, Line-Staff Difference, and Public Service Motivation: Evidence from Central and Local Government Managers in Taiwan**

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## **Abstract**

The literature of public service motivation (PSM) covers a variety of antecedents, but the discussion of trust, job selection, and line-staff is scant. The current study investigates how these factors influence Taiwan public managers' PSM. Regression results show that managers working in organizations where the core function is supporting other agencies reported the lowest level of PSM. Managers selecting their current job based on the intrinsic need, extrinsic need, and amotivational need reported a high, middle, and low level of PSM respectively. The impacts of five types of trust on PSM differed between central government managers and local government managers, although in general trust was positively associated with PSM. Surprisingly, distrust in citizens was positively related to PSM for local level managers. Findings in the current study open a new window for PSM research regarding its interface with trust as a core component of social capital, line-staff functional difference as a classic public administration issues, and work needs as motivational styles.

## **Introduction**

Public service motivation (PSM), first proposed by Perry and Wise (1990), has become a buzzword in contemporary public management research. PSM refers to one's predisposition to serve the community and public interest (Brewer & Selden, 1998; Rainey & Steinbauer, 1999), and it is also defined as "the belief, values, and attitudes that...concern the interest of a larger political entity and that motivate individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate" (Vandenabeele, 2007, p. 547). PSM as an internal motive helps enhance worker job satisfaction and organizational commitment, promotes volunteering, reform support, and organizational citizenship behavior, and reduces turnover intention and perceived red tape (Naff & Crum, 1999; Pandey, Wright, & Moynihan, 2008; Perry, Brudney, Coursey, & Littlepage, 2008; Scott & Pandey, 2005; Taylor, 2008). Given the importance of PSM, scholars have tried to identify antecedents of PSM from different angles. Empirical evidence shows that socio-demographic reasons such as education, gender, age, and socialization reasons such as religious activity, parental/family influence, and professional identification are determinative sources (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997; Perry, et al., 2008). Some scholars focus on how work experience such as the exposure to prosocial impact (Grant, 2008), rule-based control and hierarchical authority (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007), and person-environment fit (Steijn, 2008) fosters or undermines one's PSM.

Despite abundant literature about PSM antecedents, the theory of PSM still falls short of "bringing society in," an approach that Perry (2000) called for a decade ago. In his article, Perry (2000) mentioned that motivation is grounded in emotional responses to social contexts. Following his logic, should PSM be a result of one's learning process in a society as a whole? Should we speculate that public sector workers' interaction with other social units, institutions or

people, affect their motivation to serve the public interest? The author attempts to answer this question by bringing in the concept of “trust” and explore whether public managers’ trust in different segments of the society influences their PSM. Is trust positively related to PSM because it denotes benevolence and altruism (Mansbridge, 1999)? If so, is this inference universally applicable to all levels of government managers? Considering that central level managers have a more frequent contact with political leaders whereas local level managers face citizens almost on a daily basis, should trust in political leaders and trust in citizens have similar implications to central and local level managers with respect to their impacts on PSM? In this, this study analyzes how “central-local distinction” moderates the trust-PSM relationship.

In addition to the society as a broader concept, public managers may also learn from their current jobs and accordingly improve/compromise their PSM. Among others, organizational function—what kind of work needs to be performed—is the first thing that a newcomer needs to learn. A classical “line-staff” distinction of administrative agencies (Gulick, 1937) hints that some public organizations frequently receive complaints from citizens whereas some merely supervise lower level agencies or provide support to other governmental units (e.g. IT office). Does the functional difference also lead to a gap of PSM between managers working in these two types of agencies? The author will examine this classical but untested proposition.

While motivation is, admittedly, a result of social learning, one must not rule out the possibility that people are motivated by their self-concepts and values (Perry, 2000). That being said, PSM could be both nourished in the long term and pre-determined before one selects the current job. Public service jobs indeed attract those interested in serving the public interest and doing meaningful work with limited financial reward (Houston, 2000; Jurkiewicz, Massey, & Brown, 1998; Lewis & Frank, 2002), but they also allure those whose main concern is job

security and a risk-free environment. We have learned that inherent desires are predictive to one's work attitudes (Weissenberg & Gruenfeld, 1968), but does job selection as preferences preoccupied in the value system determine public managers' PSM as well? This is the last question to be examined in the current study.

By using the data collected from central and local public managers in Taiwan, the author will empirically examine the aforementioned propositions. The anticipated findings can help contribute to the expansion of PSM literature to a broader scope, covering trust as a central idea of the theory of social capital (Coleman, 1988; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 2001), central-local distinction as a core element of urban governance (Morphet, 2008), line-staff difference as a classical lesson of public administration, and job selection as motivational styles (Ryan & Deci, 2000a). The replication of Perry's (1996) PSM construct in Taiwan is another important contribution of the current study, implying the applicability of a western public administration concept to an Asian context.

## **Theories and Hypotheses**

### **Trust**

There are four sections of hypothesis development: trust, central-local moderation, line-staff distinction, and job selection. Academic discussion of trust mainly emanates from sociology. Although trust as a complex and multidimensional construct has several meanings (Brewer, 2003; Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992), the discussion of trust never ends among sociologists because it is the most essential part of social capital (Uslaner, 1999). Social capital refers to core values and norms of social organizations that facilitate cooperation for mutual benefit (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1995), and social trust serves as the foundation of moral

behavior, on which social capital is accumulated (Putnam, 1993). Whereas particularized trust (i.e. trust in relatives or friends) can be inimical to social capital, generalized trust (i.e. trust in strangers) makes people accommodate others' preferences and facilitate a healthy society (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994).

Articles devoted to investigate trust exist in the public administration literature as well. While some scholars deem trust an administrative goal that ensures the legitimacy of the regime (Choudhury, 2008; Kim, 2005) and thus should be included in performance measurement (Yang & Holzer, 2006), some look at functional benefits of trust and examine consequences and sources of trust (Albrecht & Travaglione, 2003; Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992; Nyhan, 2000; Yang, 2005). Despite abundant literature, trust is applied to different subjects and different targets in these early studies—some are concerned about how citizens trust in government; some discuss how government managers trust in citizens; some focus on how public sector employees trust their superiors, political leaders, and organizations; some aim at how top management displays trust in their subordinates. Miscellaneous relationships complicate the use of trust. In light of this, the author merely focuses on public managers as the only trust subject and explore how their trust in five targets—the democratic system, political leaders, the society, colleagues, and citizens—is correlated with PSM.

First, public managers' trust in democracy should be positively related to their PSM. In Taiwan, public service delivery is carried out in a democratic system where separation of powers is dominant and general elections of president, legislators, mayors, and local councilors are held on a regular basis. Although the abolishment of martial law in Taiwan has been over 20 years, democracy in Taiwan for many people is still “approaching the mature level” (Lu, 2010) but not genuinely mature. That being said, people's faith in democracy varies. To some degree, trust in

the democratic system reflects a government's credibility, benevolence, honesty, competency, and fairness (Kim, 2005). One's antipathy toward democracy denotes the distrust in the government's capacity for public service delivery. Distrust in democracy eventually undermines the PSM of public managers as they work as representatives of the democratic system and government through which public services are delivered. Second, public managers' trust in society (i.e. generalized trust, according to Yamagishi and Yamagishi, 1994) lays a solid basis for the growth of PSM as well. Sociologists indicate that people having generalized trust tend to engage in voluntary actions, community issues, giving to charity, and many other civil duties such as serving in a jury (Putnam, 1995). More specifically, trust matters over a wide range of moral behaviors (Uslaner, 1999). Considering that PSM is a synergy of compassion, self-sacrifice, and public interest, trust in the society as a moral and altruistic tendency (Mansbridge, 1999) should be in line with the growth of PSM for public managers. By contrast, people are unlikely to invest social capital and participate in any kind of collective action if they live in a "mean world" (Uslaner, 1999).

Third, public managers' trust in citizens and PSM should be correlated positively. Yang (2005) defines administrators' trust in citizens as "administrators' belief that the citizens who are affected by their work, when they are involved in the administrative process, will act in a fashion that is helpful to administrators' performance" (p.276). In the same article, Yang (2005) also addresses that the interaction between citizens and public administrators is beyond private exchange or an interpersonal relationship because both citizens and public administrators have democratic connotations and public administrators require a sense of civic duty as their public service ethic (Mosher, 1982). However, trust in citizens involves risks as citizens may act opportunistically based on their self interests by taking advantage of rules not specified clearly.

If public managers perceive that citizens are not honest and trustworthy, they may lose their motivation to serve the public interest as their devotion could be in vain. Fourth, trust in political leadership is a potential catalyst of PSM as well. Public managers' trust in leaders is triggered when they perceive procedural and distributive justice, organizational support, substantial feedback, and a leader's integrity and capability (Albrecht & Travaglione, 2003; Dirks & Ferrin, 2002; Nyhan, 2000). Typical consequences of trust in leadership include positive work attitudes, improved job performance, and organizational citizenship behaviors such as altruism, civic virtue, and conscientiousness (Dirks & Ferrin, 2002). Targeting at organization members initially, altruism and civic virtue may be extended to the general public in the long run. In addition, political leadership differs from general leadership to the extent that a political leader represents the government in confronting citizens. Public managers' trust in a political leader's virtue and morality implies the belief that the political leader is obedient to public benevolence. In this regard, trust in political leadership helps enhance PSM.

Finally, I anticipate that trust in colleagues also hinges on PSM in a positive manner. Indeed, superficially the motivation to serve the public seems to be unhooked with interaction with colleagues because these two objects are unrelated but trust is generally built on reciprocity (Carnevale & Wechsler, 1992). Nonetheless, individual preferences endogenous to motivation are learned from experiences in social processes (Perry, 2000), and how things are going on daily shapes one's world view (Hardin, 2006). As a result, public managers' perceptions of coworkers' benevolence, sincerity, and trustworthiness should constitute a pivotal part of their value system, which in turn, foster their willingness to repay and nourish their belief of altruism. Altruism is, however, not limited in the scope of organization but a wider society.

*H1a: Public managers' PSM is positively related to their trust in democracy, society, political leadership, citizens, and colleagues.*

### **Central and Local Government: Different Trust Scenarios**

Despite the challenge of new policy process heuristics such as contracting and network (Agranoff & McGuire, 1998; Hill & Hupe, 2002; Milward, 1994), conventional wisdom of public policy suggests that the fundamental structure of implementation inside governmental hierarchy is top-down and bottom-up. That is, strategic apex gives commands and orders to low-level agencies and hopes that street-level bureaucrats faithfully execute the commands (Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1989). When street-level bureaucrats face ambiguous policy goals and blurry demands, they distribute and redistribute resources based on their discretion and understanding of their service targets (Lipsky, 2010; Pressman & Wildavsky, 1984). In either way, local authorities are “the place of first resort in any community when individuals need information or are confronted with problems such as flooding” (Morphet, 2008, p. 3). It is also assumed that they play a key role in supporting local communities and facilitating the establishment of a civil society (Smith, 2004).

Our knowledge of policy implementation and urban governance hints that local level government managers are away from the supervision of political leaders, but they have a regular contact with citizens and communities through different channels. In other words, they are directly and intensively exposed to praises and complaints, honesty and lies, and cooperation and interruption of citizens. In addition to multiple demands from citizens, local governments in Taiwan face even more complicated urban dynamics. Urban planning, public personnel, and different kinds of public service provision in the local area are often accompanied by intricate



“guanxi” (i.e. interpersonal ties) combined with mafia politics, barter vote, and patronage-cliental relationships (Bosco, 1992; Chao, 1998). In this regard, local level public managers’ understanding toward the societal honesty, including whether people tend to lie, take advantage of others, or make insincere compliments in order to earn political benefits is direct, strong, intense, and even inseparable from public service provision.

Central government managers have a sharply different vision from local managers. They seldom confront citizens and their complaints directly, so they learn local politics and citizen behaviors from education, media, friends, and many other approaches but not from face-to-face exposure. It does not denote that they are ignorant about citizens and the general public in terms of their trustworthiness, but instead, hint that their perceptions of citizens may be independent from the civil service provision system as their work content is mainly a synthesis of legislative oversight, court orders, media interviews, inter-organizational coordination, and issues that do not concern direct interactions with citizens and local political actors (Rainey, 2009). The work content for central public managers also hints that their definition of society as a target of trust may not be identical to the scope of society in the mind of local level managers whose world is occupied by urban politics. The location of central level managers is closer to the strategic apex of a governmental hierarchy, so managers maintain a frequent contact with political appointees by receiving commands and providing suggestions. This fuels another possibility of central-field gap with respect to central and local managers’ understanding of political leadership.

I hypothesize that the magnitude of trust-PSM relationships varies according to the intensity of interaction between public managers and trust objects. To the extent that local level managers deal with citizen issues more directly, and the society they perceive is closely linked to

service delivery, the impact of trust in citizens and the society on PSM should be stronger at the local level. By contrast, the impact of trust in political leadership is stronger at the central level.

*H1b: A positive relationship between PSM and trust in citizens is stronger among local level public managers than central level public managers.*

*H1c: A positive relationship between PSM and trust in the society is stronger among local level public managers than central level public managers.*

*H1d: A positive relationship between PSM and trust in political leadership is stronger among central level public managers than local level public managers.*

### **Line-Staff Distinction as Organizational Functions**

In addition to the lessons learned from interpersonal dynamics, socialization processes include organizational shaping at the current workplace as well. Organizational function, a classical issue in the literature of line-staff distinction, tremendously shapes a newcomer's values and preferences. Ideally, line people perform main functions of the agency and exercise powers of decision and command, whereas staff people assist functions to facilitate the work of lines and sometimes monitor their performance (Gulick, 1937; Kettl & Fesler, 2005). Empirical studies have found that line as compared to staff workers show more positive work attitudes (e.g. job satisfaction and organizational commitment), perceive greater need fulfillment, feel less susceptible to organizational politics, and demonstrate to be more service-oriented but weaker at openness to new ideas, relationships, and adaptability to change (Church & Waclawski, 2001; Koslowsky, 1990; Mintzberg, 1989; Porter, 1963), implying the existence of different organizational shaping mechanisms for line and staff workers.

However, the line-staff dichotomy seems arbitrary since public sector work in many areas is not black and white. Barzelay and Armajani (1990) indicated that two types of staff agencies exist in the modern public sector, serving two different clients respectively: while one helps political appointees secure leverage over line agencies through planning and policy analysis, the other one provides the lines with common needs such as personnel, finance, and equipment. That being said, the taxonomy of organizational function can be three-dimensional: serving the public as the line function, policy making as the first staff function, and supporting political appointees and other administrative agencies as the second staff function. Due to different levels of exposure to public issues in terms of frequency and intensity, I suspect that public managers' PSM will be the strongest if they work as a public servant, weaker if they work as a policy analyst, and even weaker if they work as an administrative supporter.

*H2: Public managers' PSM is the strongest among those working in agencies where the primary function is serving the public; weaker among those working in agencies where the primary function is policy making; the weakest among those working in agencies where the primary function is administrative assistance.*

### **Job Selection as Inherent Work Needs**

Finally, at the core of motivation is not only socialization but also inherent values prior to workplace socialization (Perry, 2000). Several early psychological studies have demonstrated that values, work needs, personal background, or individual differences are important antecedents of motivation-related work attitudes (e.g. job involvement and job satisfaction) and identification with the organization (Gorn & Kanungo, 1980; Hall, Schneider, & Nygren, 1970; Kuhlen, 1968; Rabinowitz, Hall, & Goodale, 1977; Ruh, White, & Wood, 1975). Some studies

found that personality influences work attitudes (Bozionelos, 2004; Judge, Heller, & Mount, 2002). Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that the formation of PSM is also a result of both workplace socialization and innate individual differences. This section particularly focuses on reasons of selecting public sector jobs as one's work needs.

Traditionally, scholars prefer using a simple intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy to understand one's work needs. For example, Herzberg's (1966) Two-Factor Theory (i.e. hygiene factors and motivators) is based on this dichotomy. The use of "higher order needs" in Maslow's (1954) Needs Hierarchy also implies the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic needs (Beehr, Walsh, & Taber, 1976; Hackman & Lawler, 1971). However, this dichotomy oversimplifies one's value system and how work needs and organizational behaviors are related. For example, both a desire for job security and a desire for a job itself (i.e. choosing the current job because job alternatives were limited) fall into the category of extrinsic work needs, but only a need for a job itself serves as an impediment in generating positive work attitudes (Chen, 2010a). The locus of causality associated with each work need, which is underpinned by the theory of self-determination (Deci & Ryan, 1985; Ryan & Deci, 2000b), accounts for the difference of need-attitude relationships.

Self-Determination Theory (SDT) accentuates the use of a spectrum in which intrinsic motivation, extrinsic motivation, and amotivation are analyzed sequentially and distinctively. Including "amotivation" into discussion is one of the most distinctive features of this theory. Amotivation is defined as "not valuing an activity, not feeling competent to do it, or not believing it will yield a desired outcome" (Ryan & Deci, 2000a, p. 61). Workers exhibiting a desire for something apart from work or job itself such as the cost of living in a certain region or a job *per se* within limited choices may fall into this category. A person having intrinsic work needs exhibit the strongest internal locus causality, showing that they have full control over the

consequences of their behaviors. The internal locus of causality diminishes (i.e. becomes more external) when one has extrinsic work needs. If workers are amotivated, their locus of causality becomes “impersonal,” implying that consequences of their behaviors are off their concern.

I anticipate that PSM will be correlated with intrinsic work needs positively but with amotivaitonal work needs negatively. The relationship between extrinsic work needs and PSM could be in between the two aforementioned relationships. The theory of affectivity (Watson & Clark, 1984; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988) first endorses my speculation. Based on this theory, people who feel that their work is rewarded intrinsically often express high positive affectivity (Isen, 2000) and accordingly report being joyful, exhilarated, and enthusiastic (Gardner, Rozell, & Walumbwa, 2004). By contrast, extrinsic motivators appear to generate a greater influence on people having negative affectivity (Isen, 2000). People having negative affectivity are often predisposed to experience more negative emotions such as being afraid, anxious, and angry (Gardner, et al., 2004). Assuming SDT is correct in terms of its taxonomy of motivational styles, those having amotivational work needs should have even more negative affectivity. To the extent that PSM requires one to be compassionate and oriented to public interest, intrinsic work needs as a source of enthusiasm should be a positive predictor of PSM whereas amotivational work needs as an origin of fear should undermine PSM.

Moreover, an optimistic explanatory style can be derived from a person’s internal locus of causality whereas a pessimistic explanatory style is often associated with an external locus of causality, according to the theory of attribution (Weiner, 1986). Individuals having an external locus of causality tend to show more blaming behavior than those having an internal locus of causality upon receiving failure feedback because they often attribute the outcomes to bad luck instead of poor ability (Gilmor & Minton, 1974). Following this logic, people having intrinsic

work needs, extrinsic work needs, and amotivaitonal work needs should different levels of optimistic explanatory styles stemming from their disparate locus of causality. Given that public service work is synonymous with red tape, political interference, and hierarchical control, PSM as a spirit of sacrifice will require public managers to have a more optimistic explanatory style and intrinsic work needs to help them confront multiple problems originating from bureaucratic pathology. In this study, I select three reasons of selecting the current job—“opportunities to challenge myself,” “job security,” and “don’t know why; just come to try it”—to represent intrinsic, extrinsic, and amotivational work needs respectively.

*H3a: “Opportunities to challenge myself” as a reason of current job selection is a positive predictor of PSM.*

*H3b: “Don’t know why; just come to try it” as a reason of current job selection is a negative predictor of PSM.*

*H3c: The impact of “job security” as a reason of current job selection has an impact on PSM in between the impacts addressed in H3a and H3b.*

## **Data and Variables**

Data used in the current study were collected from middle managers working at Taipei City government and central government in Taiwan. In a fourteen-grade hierarchy, the grades of middle managers are generally between 7 and 9. The author and the survey team from Taiwan National Chengchi University obtained contact information of 1,189 middle managers working at central government and 771 working at Taipei City government from the Central Personnel Administration in Taiwan. Questionnaires were sent to all the 1,960 middle managers, and 1,272 were successfully collected. The response rate reached 64.90%.

The author selected 15 ordinal items (3 for attraction to policy making; 4 for commitment to public interest; 3 for compassion; 5 for self-sacrifice) with 1=strongly disagree and 6=strongly agree from the four-dimensional PSM construct developed by Perry (1996). The most fundamental criterion applied to item selection is translation—whether an item can be translated to Chinese with little tweak of meaning. To examine whether the selected 15 items represent 4 dimensions as Perry (1996) proposed, the author employed a second-order Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) by using Amos 18 to test if the 4 constructs of PSM are salient and distinct. Overall fit indexes reported in Table 1 show that the entire model is within acceptable levels, supporting the construct validity of this second-order measurement model. Cronbach’s alpha value for each construct is between .63 and .80. Cronbach’s alpha for the global PSM index (the summation of 15 items) is .82. Please refer to Appendix A for more details regarding dependent variable measurement.

[Insert Table 1 Here]

Several ordinal variables with 1=strongly disagree and 6=strongly agree are employed to measure trust. Trust in democracy is measured by a single inverse ordinal item “democracy is one of the worst political systems in the world.” Items used to measure trust in the society, trust in citizens, and trust in political leadership are adapted from Yamagishi & Yamagishi (1994), Yang (2005), and Nyhan (2000) respectively. Cronbach’s alpha for all the constructs are over .78. The construct of trust in colleagues consists of five items asking the situation of information sharing, the sincerity of interaction, and the faith in the colleagues’ professional ethics. Cronbach’s alpha for this construct also reaches .76. Items used to measure reasons of job selection as work needs, including “opportunities to challenge myself,” “job security,” and “just come to try it” are on the ordinal level (1=strongly disagree and 6=strongly agree) as well.

Concerning organizational functions, there is one question asking respondents to choose the most important function among serving the public, policy making, and supporting other agencies. By using “supporting other agencies” as the base category, the author created two dummy variables after recoding.

There are seven control variables in the current study: gender, public service tenure, current job tenure, a move-up position, switching into the public sector from other sectors, a technical position, and span of control. Empirical evidence supports that male and service tenure are positive predictors of PSM (Moynihan & Pandey, 2007; Perry, 1997). Because empirical studies of job tenure often separate current job tenure from service tenure or organizational tenure (Bedeian, Ferris, & Kacmar, 1992), this study follows this approach by controlling for current job tenure. The author also suspects that managers holding a technical position express weaker PSM in comparison to those holding an administrative position due to the nature of their work. Those switching into the public sector should be less likely than non-switchers to show strong PSM because switchers coming to work in the government, in many cases, are attracted by job security and benefits instead of public service opportunities (Chen, 2010b). Span of control should be negatively related to PSM as managers need to sacrifice the time and energy spent on public service for supervision of subordinates. A move-up position may imply the increase of span of control, accordingly deteriorating PSM.

[Insert Table 2 Here]

## **Statistical Findings**

The nature of the dependent variable (DV) allows one to model variable relationships with OLS regression. However, the distribution of the global PSM index displayed in Figure 1 shows possible heteroscedasticity to be embedded in the model due to its high skewness. I



adopted Breusch-Pagan post-regression test to examine whether the model was heteroscedastic, and the results confirmed my conjecture. As a result, I fixed this problem with two methods: robust standard errors and generalized linear square (GLS) model. Regression results are reported in Table 3. The results for each single dimension of PSM as DV differ little from the results in the global index model, so they are placed in Appendix B for references.

[Insert Figure 1 Here]

In Table 3, results in Model 1 (OLS plus robust standard errors) and Model 2 (GLS) are similar, so I only interpret results in Model 1. First, among all the trust variables, only trust in democracy ( $B = .084$ ;  $p < .00$ ) and trust in colleagues ( $B = .091$ ;  $p < .00$ ) are statistically significant, although trust in political leadership is approaching the significance level ( $B = .032$ ;  $p < .11$ ). Second, in comparison to those working in organizations where administrative assistance is the main function, public managers working in organizations where the main function is serving the public ( $B = .111$ ;  $p < .01$ ) and policy making ( $B = .064$ ;  $p < .10$ ) expressed significantly stronger PSM. The result of post-regression Wald-test under  $H_0: B(\textit{-serving the public}) = B(\textit{policy making})$  has a  $p$  value  $< .05$ , showing that managers working in agencies where the main function is serving the public has stronger PSM than those working in agencies where the main function is policy making. The findings support Hypothesis 2, stating that functional shaping determines PSM. Third, PSM is related to intrinsic, extrinsic, and amotivational work needs differently. Whereas seeking a challenging job positively predicts PSM at the 95% confidence level, selecting the current job with a reason of “don’t know why” negatively predicts PSM at the 95% confidence level. The relationship between a need for job security and PSM, however, is not statistically significant. The result of post-regression Wald-test under  $H_0: B(\textit{challenging myself}) = B(\textit{job security})$  has a  $p$  value  $< .05$ , and the result of

Wald-test under  $H_0: B(\text{job security}) = B(\text{don't know why})$  has a  $p$  value  $< .00$ . These findings provide remarkable support for Hypothesis 3a, 3b, and 3c. Concerning the influence of control variables, gender and public service tenure have a positive and statistically significant coefficient, implying that male and experienced public managers tend to express stronger PSM. Span of control as number of employees supervised has a negative and statistically significant coefficient, an indication that the increase of subordinates undermines a manager's PSM. The rest of control variables are, however, not statistically significant.

[Insert Table 3 Here]

Model 3 and Model 4, which present results with interaction terms of trust (central-local as the moderator), help us examine whether the impacts of trust in five targets on PSM differ between central level public managers and local level public managers. The logic of dummy variable moderation suggests that trust-PSM relationships are different between central and local managers if coefficients of interaction terms are statistically significant. In both models, I found three statistically significant coefficients (trust in the society, citizens, and political leadership), which seemingly support Hypothesis 1b, 1c, and 1d. Indeed, trust in society has a positive effect on PSM for local level managers ( $B = .136; p < .00$ ) but not for central level managers ( $B = -.026; p < .31$ ) as addressed in H1c, and trust in political leadership has a positive impact on PSM for central managers ( $B = .066; p < .00$ ) but not for local managers ( $B = -.028; p < .29$ ) as mentioned in H1d. However, an unexpected finding appears in trust in citizens. The impact of trust in citizens for local managers is *significantly negative* ( $B = -.072; p < .04$ ) at the 95% confidence level but insignificant for central managers ( $B = .019; p < .49$ ). This finding calls for more in-depth discussion. Please refer to Table 4 for the calculation of coefficients and statistical significance of interactive terms and non-interactive terms appearing in Model 3.

[Insert Table 4 Here]

## **Discussion**

All hypotheses in the current study have received remarkable support from statistical findings except the relationship between trust in citizens and PSM. Findings show that local managers' PSM increases when they perceive that citizens are not trustworthy, although in other cases trust serves as a positive catalyst of PSM nourishment. Can we identify any reasonable explanation regarding why distrust in citizens may eventually enhances one's compassion, service interest, and motivation to self-sacrifice? Does trust in citizens carry a distinctive implication to public service work?

Trust embraces vulnerability and risk (Choudhury, 2008; Mansbridge, 1999; Uslaner, 1999). It is also mutual and relational, and familiarity is a foundation of relational trust (Choudhury, 2008; Warren, 1999). Trust between citizens and government should not be understood as an even game of rational choice – citizens are “not in a position to trust” because they cannot know relevant interests or circumstances (Hardin, 1999). Just because citizens know little about how civil service programs run by local government help further their own aims do they demonstrate strong tendency of self-preservation by taking advantage of imperfect rules, protecting their own interests, showing dishonesty to local government managers. This may eventually lead to cynical attitudes, a pervasive disbelief in the possibility of good (Berman, 1997). That is, government instead of citizens should be a more appropriate candidate to initiate mutual trust. In addition to citizen participation and enhancing local government's reputation, a typical strategy employed in facing opportunistic and cynical citizens is evoking citizens' awareness of contemporary civil service programs. More specifically, public administrators “reach out and explain what government does and how it serves the interests of citizens through

persistent and diverse information campaign” (Berman, 1997, p. 106). In this, a positive relationship between local government managers’ PSM and perceived citizen untrustworthiness may be understood as their willingness of “inculcation.”

Another possibility that accounts for this unexpected finding is the nature of public service occupation, especially in the Asian context. It is undeniable that public service jobs frequently impose a negative impression on citizens due to consequences of bureaucratic pathology such as slowness, inefficiency, and irresponsiveness. However, public administration scholars have never stopped calling for vocational ethics as internal accountability (Finer, 1941; Friedrich, 1940). To many civil servants, public service career is “not entirely a matter of individual interests and pursuits but seems to connect on with larger forces – of God, nation, state, family, or profession” (Wolf & Bacher, 1990, pp. 167-168). In Taiwan, where people have long been immersed in a culture of Confucianism, local public civil servants are even expected to be “officials resembling parents” (i.e. 父母官 in Chinese) who treat citizens as their children. They not only love children, protect children from danger, and take care of children, but also educate children when children make mistakes. This unique expectation in the Asian context may be the fundamental cause that evokes local public managers’ PSM when they perceive untrustworthiness from citizens. In their mind, citizens are kids and need to be educated and loved so they will ultimately know their parents’ hardness and effort.

## **Conclusion**

After a decade of Perry’s (2000) calling of “bringing the society in,” the current study attempts to expand realm of PSM theory so as to create an interface between public management and sociological discourse. The author first consulted the theory of trust as a core element of

social capital and elaborated five targets of trust including democracy, the society, political leaders, citizens, and colleagues. Furthermore, the author tried to identify interpersonal, societal, and institutional sources that bridge trust in the five targets and the enhancement of PSM. However, people's location determines the world they witness and understand. As an old proverb "seeing is believing" reminds us, public managers' perceptions of different targets' trustworthiness and how they are associated with PSM depend on whether public managers have frequent and intense contact with trust targets. As such, the author examined the gap between central and local level public managers since they do not have equally direct interactions with political leaders and citizens, and in addition, they have sharply different understanding of the society and how the society is associated with public service provision.

Environmental shaping as a process of socialization includes not only social forces but organizational forces. Concerning how organizational context shapes PSM, the current study attended line-staff difference, an old-fashioned but rarely tested topic. Given the staff function is comprised of both supporting other administrative agencies and providing political appointees necessary help via planning and analysis, the author hypothesized that public managers' PSM varies according to their organizational functions – line function as serving the public, the staff function as administrative assistance, or the staff function as policy analysis. Finally, individual differences with respect to inherent work needs are as important as socialization in determining worker PSM. Although a classical intrinsic-extrinsic dichotomy has been pervasively used in studying organizational behavior, the author supplemented "amotivational work needs" to further discern public managers' different locus of causality, attribution styles, affectivity, and their connection to PSM. Based on the theory of self-determination, the author hypothesized that

public managers having intrinsic, extrinsic, and amotivational work needs express different levels of PSM.

Statistical findings supported most of my hypotheses. Public managers working in agencies where the function is serving the public, policy making, and administrative assistance reported high, middle, and low levels of PSM respectively. PSM was positively related to intrinsic work needs, negatively related to amotivational work needs, and insignificantly related to extrinsic work needs. In addition, public managers' trust genuinely shaped their PSM in a positive fashion. Moreover, the relationship of PSM with trust in the society was stronger at the local level whereas the relationship with trust in political leadership was stronger at the central level, as I hypothesized. However, the relationship of PSM with distrust in citizens was positive, beyond my expectation. I surmised that the ideal of "public officials should act like parents" in an Asian context, particularly under the influence of Confucianism, leads local level public managers in Taiwan to react citizens' untrustworthiness with even more patience, compassion, and inculcation instead of frustration and retreat from a public service terrain.

In sum, this study supports that PSM, similar to most motivation theories, is a synergy of both after-job-selection workplace socialization and pre-job-selection preferences in one's value system. Theoretically, findings in this study serve as a shortcut for public management scholars to access the a new sphere of PSM regarding its connection to trust as a core element of social capital, line-staff functional difference as a classical but untested public administration issues, and work needs as motivational styles. In practice, one of the most important concerns for public administrators is the improvement of the public sector's PSM. Findings indicate that enhancing public sector employees' faith in democracy, facilitating mutual understanding among colleagues, and demonstrating integrity in political leadership appear to be effective methods. In screening

newcomers, intrinsic work needs such as a desire for challenging oneself will be accompanied by a positive impact on PSM.

It has been about two decades since the initiation of PSM by Perry and Wise (1990). Normative and empirical development of PSM in these years has laid a solid foundation for public administration scholars to pioneer in “exporting theories” to other social science disciplines. For example, Steijn (2008) proposed that the understanding of PSM can be extended to the private sector or business administration. Despite this conspicuous academic progress, we admit that the theory of PSM requires constant refinement and extension. This study only touches the brim. More empirical evidence regarding antecedents and consequences of PSM, such as whether PSM enhances public managers’ organizational and sectoral confidence so as to reduce their tendency to accept contracting-out or privatization as the best alternative for efficiency amelioration, merits further exploration in the future.

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## Tables and Figures


**Table 1 Fit Indexes of the Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) Model**

	Chi square	df	RFI	NFI	GFI	CFI	RMSR	RMSEA
Suggested cut-off			>.90	>.90	>.90	>.90	<.08	<.08
Values of the model	510.97	86	.90	.92	.95	.93	.05	.06

**Table 2 Descriptive Statistics**

	N	Mean	SD	Min	Max
PSM-0 Global index	1220	4.66	0.50	1.6	6
PSM-1 Policy making	1258	4.04	0.88	1	6
PSM-2 Public interest	1253	4.79	0.67	1.75	6
PSM-3 Compassion	1266	5.38	0.58	1	6
PSM-4 Self sacrifice	1243	4.49	0.73	1.6	6
Trust in democracy	1263	4.23	1.05	1	6
Trust in society	1261	3.67	0.82	1	6
Trust in citizens	1254	3.35	0.75	1	6
Trust in political leaders	1213	4.01	0.96	1	6
Trust in colleagues	1257	4.37	0.70	1.4	6
Central government	1256	0.60	0.49	0	1
Intrinsic motivation	1258	4.37	1.03	1	6
Extrinsic motivation	1260	5.06	0.75	1	6
Amotivation	1259	2.59	1.13	1	6
Function: serving the public	1104	0.42	0.49	0	1
Function: policy making	1104	0.39	0.49	0	1
Male	1255	0.55	0.50	0	1
Public sector tenure	1246	19.65	7.26	2	43
Current job tenure	1249	5.03	5.18	0	41
Technical job	1253	0.19	0.39	0	1
Switching into the public sector	1272	0.06	0.23	0	1
A move-up position	1264	0.74	0.44	0	1
Span of control	1249	11.82	47.16	0	1500

**Figure 1 Distribution of the Dependent Variable (PSM Global Index)**



**Table 3 OLS and GLS Regression: Global PSM as DV**

DV: PSM (Global index, alpha =.82)	Model 1: OLS (Robust SDs)		Model 2: GLS		Model 3: OLS (Robust SDs)		Model 4: GLS	
	Coef.	p	Coef.	p	Coef.	p	Coef.	p
<u>Trust</u>								
Trust in democracy	<u>0.084</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.084</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.059</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.059</u>	<u>0.01</u>
Trust in society	0.025	0.31	0.025	0.26	<u>0.136</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.136</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Trust in citizens	-0.007	0.78	-0.007	0.76	<u>-0.072</u>	<u>0.04</u>	<u>-0.072</u>	<u>0.04</u>
Trust in political leaders	0.032	0.11	0.032	0.07	<u>-0.028</u>	<u>0.29</u>	<u>-0.028</u>	<u>0.31</u>
Trust in colleagues	<u>0.091</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.091</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.138</u>	<u>0.01</u>	<u>0.138</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Central vs. Local (central = 1; local = 0)	--	--	--	--	<u>-0.105</u>	<u>0.77</u>	<u>-0.105</u>	<u>0.73</u>
Trust in democracy*central	--	--	--	--	0.040	0.17	0.040	0.16
Trust in society *central	--	--	--	--	<u>-0.164</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>-0.164</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Trust in citizens*central	--	--	--	--	<u>0.091</u>	<u>0.05</u>	<u>0.091</u>	<u>0.04</u>
Trust in political leaders*central	--	--	--	--	<u>0.094</u>	<u>0.01</u>	<u>0.094</u>	<u>0.01</u>
Trust in colleagues*central	--	--	--	--	<u>-0.072</u>	<u>0.23</u>	<u>-0.072</u>	<u>0.14</u>
<u>Job selection as work needs</u>								
Intrinsic: Challenging myself	<u>0.089</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.089</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.085</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.085</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Extrinsic: Job security	0.027	0.25	0.027	0.17	0.027	0.25	0.027	0.17
Amotivational: Don't know; just try it	<u>-0.089</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>-0.089</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>-0.088</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>-0.088</u>	<u>0.00</u>
<u>Line-staff difference</u>								
Function: Serving the public	<u>0.111</u>	<u>0.01</u>	<u>0.111</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.132</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.132</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Function: Policy making	0.064	0.10	0.064	0.11	0.071	0.06	0.071	0.07
<u>Controls</u>								
Male	<u>0.061</u>	<u>0.03</u>	<u>0.061</u>	<u>0.03</u>	<u>0.063</u>	<u>0.03</u>	<u>0.063</u>	<u>0.03</u>
Public sector tenure	<u>0.009</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.009</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.009</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.009</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Current job tenure	-0.001	0.70	-0.001	0.68	-0.002	0.55	-0.002	0.51
A technical position	0.013	0.72	0.013	0.72	0.024	0.51	0.024	0.51
Switching in the public sector	0.038	0.58	0.038	0.56	0.044	0.51	0.044	0.49
A move-up position	-0.017	0.60	-0.017	0.59	-0.019	0.57	-0.019	0.56
Span of control/1000	<u>-0.619</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>-0.619</u>	<u>0.02</u>	<u>-0.559</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>-0.559</u>	<u>0.04</u>
Constant	<u>3.863</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>3.863</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>3.918</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>3.918</u>	<u>0.00</u>
N	966		966		966		966	
R-square	0.28				0.30			

Underlined coefficients: statistical significance  $p < .05$ **Table 4 Local-Central Comparison: The Impacts of Trust on PSM**

	Local managers		Ho: B (original) – B (interactive) = 0	Central managers	
	Coef.	p		Coef.	p
Trust in democracy	<u>0.059</u>	<u>0.00</u>	0.059 + 0.040 =	<u>0.099</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Trust in society	<u>0.136</u>	<u>0.00</u>	0.136 - 0.164 =	-0.026	0.31
Trust in citizens	<u>-0.072</u>	<u>0.04</u>	-0.072 + 0.091 =	0.019	0.49
Trust in political leaders	-0.028	0.29	-0.028 + 0.094 =	<u>0.066</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Trust in colleagues	<u>0.138</u>	<u>0.01</u>	0.138 - 0.072 =	<u>0.066</u>	<u>0.03</u>

Underlined coefficients: statistical significance  $p < .05$

## Appendix A Variable Measurement

### **Dependent Variables: PSM (1=strongly disagree; 6=strongly agree)**

Attraction to Policy Making (Cronbach's alpha = .63)

- Politics is a dirty word (rev)
- I don't care much for politicians (rev)
- The give and take of public policy making doesn't appeal me (rev)

Commitment to the Public Interest (Cronbach's alpha = .73)

- It is hard for me to get interested in what is going on in my community (rev)
- I unselfishly contribute to my community
- I consider public service my civic duty
- I would like to know more about what people need in my homeland

Compassion (Cronbach's alpha = .80)

- I am often moved by the plight of the underprivileged
- I am often reminded how dependent we are on one another
- Many public welfare programs are indispensable

Self-Sacrifice (Cronbach's alpha = .79)

- Making a difference in society means more to me than personal achievement
- I would risk my career for the public good of society
- Contribution to the society is my obligation
- Contributing to the society is more important than to taking from the society
- I can accept a policy that benefits the society but harms my interests

PSM global index (15 items) = .82

### **Independent Variables (I): Trust (1=strongly disagree; 6=strongly agree)**

Trust in democracy (single item):

- Democracy is one of the worst political systems in the world (rev)

Trust in society (Cronbach's alpha = .78)

- In Taiwan, most people tell a lie when they can benefit by doing so (rev)
- In Taiwan, when someone says something complimentary about you it's because they want to get something from you (rev)
- In Taiwan, people will take advantage of you if you work with them (rev)
- In Taiwan, in dealing with strangers, one is better off to be cautious until they have provided evidence that they are trustworthy (rev)

Trust in citizens: When you contact with general public on your duty, they... (Cronbach's alpha = .78)

- They don't understand what you are doing (rev)
- When government regulations are ambiguous, they always try to take advantage of them (rev)
- You cannot rely on them to always tell the truth (rev)
- They always want to help you with your job
- Their only concern is whether their personal interests are well protected (rev)

Trust in political leaders/appointees (Cronbach's alpha = .91)

- I have confidence that my political supervisor is technically competent at the critical elements of his/her job
- When my political supervisor tells me something, I can rely on what s/he tells me
- My political supervisor will back me up in a pinch
- I feel that I can tell my political supervisor anything about my job
- I receive frequent and fair appraisals of my job performance from my political supervisor
- My political leader is a respectful person of highest virtue

Trust in colleagues (Cronbach's alpha = .76)

- My colleagues share important information related to work with no reservation
- I keep a strong faith in my colleagues as they have a high level of professional ethics
- In this organization, there seems to be an invisible barrier between people (rev)
- My interaction with my colleagues is transactional and insincere (rev)
- My conflicts with my colleagues at work can always be resolved successfully

### **Independent variables (II): Job selection (1=strongly disagree; 6=strongly agree)**

Job selection: Reasons that determined your selection of the current job (three independent items)

- Intrinsic need: Opportunities of challenging myself
- Extrinsic need: Job security
- Amotivational need: I don't why I chose this job. Just try and see what will happen

### **Independent variables (III): Staff-line difference (categorical)**

Functions of the organization (1 question; 3 categories)

- Serving the public
- Policy making
- Supporting other agencies (base category)

### **Control Variables**

1. Gender (male = 1; female = 0)
2. Public service tenure (interval)
3. Current job tenure (interval)
4. A move-up position (up-move = 1; flat transfer or down-move = 0)
5. Switching into the public sector from other sectors (switchers = 1; non-switchers = 0)
6. Technical vs. administrative position (technical =1; administrative = 0)
7. Span of control: number of employees supervised in the current job (interval)



## Appendix B Regression Results for Four Individual Dimensions of PSM

DV: Four dimensions of PSM (Robust SD errors employed)	Model 1: Policy making		Model 2: Public interest		Model 3: Compassion		Model 4: Self-sacrifice	
	Coef.	p	Coef.	p	Coef.	p	Coef.	p
<u>Trust</u>								
Trust in democracy	<u>0.241</u>	<u>0.00</u>	0.010	0.76	0.026	0.37	0.011	0.71
Trust in society	<u>0.229</u>	<u>0.01</u>	<u>0.148</u>	<u>0.01</u>	0.070	0.13	0.099	0.09
Trust in citizens	-0.042	0.57	<u>-0.142</u>	<u>0.01</u>	-0.075	0.09	-0.027	0.62
Trust in political leaders	0.015	0.81	<u>-0.032</u>	0.44	-0.036	0.31	-0.048	0.27
Trust in colleagues	0.131	0.13	<u>0.145</u>	<u>0.04</u>	<u>0.139</u>	<u>0.03</u>	<u>0.150</u>	<u>0.02</u>
Central vs. Local (central = 1; local = 0)	0.231	0.72	0.259	0.61	-0.103	0.81	-0.629	0.24
Trust in democracy*central	0.060	0.29	0.042	0.35	-0.009	0.82	0.050	0.25
Trust in society *central	-0.141	0.15	<u>-0.164</u>	<u>0.03</u>	<u>-0.122</u>	<u>0.04</u>	<u>-0.189</u>	<u>0.01</u>
Trust in citizens*central	0.053	0.56	<u>0.162</u>	<u>0.02</u>	0.057	0.33	0.071	0.32
Trust in political leaders*central	0.087	0.23	<u>0.103</u>	<u>0.06</u>	0.035	0.46	<u>0.132</u>	<u>0.02</u>
Trust in colleagues*central	-0.145	0.16	-0.106	0.22	-0.048	0.53	-0.013	0.88
<u>Job selection as work needs</u>								
Intrinsic: Challenging myself	0.048	0.09	<u>0.091</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.073</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.105</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Extrinsic: Job security	0.016	0.65	0.014	0.66	<b>0.084</b>	<b>0.00</b>	0.015	0.70
Amotivational: Don't know; just try it	<u>-0.075</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>-0.130</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>-0.063</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>-0.083</u>	<u>0.00</u>
<u>Line-staff difference</u>								
Function: Serving the public	-0.010	0.88	<u>0.154</u>	<u>0.01</u>	0.091	0.09	<u>0.247</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Function: Policy making	0.073	0.28	0.108	0.06	0.065	0.19	0.063	0.28
<u>Controls</u>								
Male	<u>0.099</u>	<u>0.06</u>	<u>0.149</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<b>-0.067</b>	<b>0.06</b>	0.050	0.26
Public sector tenure	0.003	0.49	<u>0.008</u>	<u>0.01</u>	<u>0.008</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>0.016</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Current job tenure	-0.004	0.47	-0.003	0.51	-0.004	0.20	0.002	0.73
A technical position	0.015	0.82	0.063	0.23	-0.021	0.64	0.046	0.41
Switching in the public sector	-0.019	0.89	-0.044	0.67	0.129	0.11	0.051	0.61
A move-up position	0.056	0.34	0.025	0.59	0.008	0.85	<b>-0.113</b>	<b>0.02</b>
Span of control/1000	-0.427	0.24	<u>-0.931</u>	<u>0.01</u>	-0.097	0.67	<u>-0.583</u>	<u>0.00</u>
Constant	<u>4.405</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>3.769</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>4.163</u>	<u>0.00</u>	<u>3.522</u>	<u>0.00</u>
N	988		984		992		983	
R-square	0.24		0.19		0.13		0.19	

Underlined coefficients: statistical significance  $p < .05$