English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  全文筆數/總筆數 : 71463/104422 (68%)
造訪人次 : 19148116      線上人數 : 238
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
搜尋範圍 查詢小技巧:
  • 您可在西文檢索詞彙前後加上"雙引號",以獲取較精準的檢索結果
  • 若欲以作者姓名搜尋,建議至進階搜尋限定作者欄位,可獲得較完整資料
  • 進階搜尋
    政大機構典藏 > 政大學報 > 第82期 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/102336
    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/102336


    題名: 責任保險危機之補救措施
    其他題名: A Remedy for the Liability Insurance Crisis
    作者: 陳彩稚
    Chen, Tsai-Jyh
    貢獻者: 風險管理與保險學系
    關鍵詞: 責任保險危機;非對稱責任;合併制度
    Liability Insurance Crisis;Decoupling Liability;Mixed system;Incentive of Safety Care;Liability Damages Award
    日期: 2001-06
    上傳時間: 2016-09-29 16:55:47 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 責任保險由於牽涉被保人(肇事人)、受害人與保險人三方當事人,以及社會之侵權法律制度,因此本身具有相當複雜之道德危險問題。自1980年代以來,保險人即使年年提高保費,仍然無法支應飛漲的理賠支出,使得保險人供給意願大為降低,此種情況在商業責任保險尤其明顯,常稱之為「責任保險危機」。近年來風險管理人員紛紛提出替代責任保險之方案,以解決侵權賠償之難題,但本文認為保險之風險理財功能,是其他方法所難以匹敵的,只要能夠降低其道德危險問題,保險仍是最佳之侵權責任賠償工具。因此本文納入「非對稱責任」(decoupling liability)之理念,經由模型分析而提出一項建議,採用民營責任保險與公共基金之合併制度,來減緩此種道德危險與保險供給困境。在此制度下,廠商從事有風險之事業時,其預期總成本將高於意外事故之預期損失賠償金額,使得廠商應有之安全謹慎動機得以維持,不至於因責任保險之存在,而疏忽安全防護工作。另一方面,由於受害人可直接獲自保險人之損失賠償金減少,因此保費可以降低,使被保人(廠商)有能力購買保險,並且由於保險賠償金減少,可減輕受害人利用保險而哄抬索賠的現象。引起事故之廠商必須繳納罰款以成立公共基金,公共基金部分用以從事風險管理之研究,以提昇社會整體之生活安全水準,對於消費大眾(潛在受害人)是一種非貨幣性補償;部分基金則用以作為責任保險之安全準備金,減少保險人無力清償的機率,因此可提高保險人供給責任保險之誘因。
    Because liability insurance involves the insured (the injurer), the victim, the insurer and the legal system, the moral hazard in liability insurance is much more complicated than other types of insurance. The soaring claim costs of liability insurance since 1980's have reduced the incentive of the insurer to supply liability insurance. Risk managers have recently tried to develop the alternative risk-transfer techniques for liability risks. However, this paper considers that liability insurance remains the best choice for financing legal risk once the moral hazard problem can be mitigated. To mitigate the moral hazard and supply crisis of liability insurance, this paper incorporates the concept of decoupling liability and proposes a remedy through a mixed system of private insurance and public fund. Under this system, the expected total cost for the firm to engage in risky activity must be greater than expected loss payment of an accident so that the incentive of safety care can be maintained. The insurance premium is lowered so to be affordable by the insured. The monetary compensation paid by the insurer to the victim is reduced which mitigates social inflation of liability damages award. The public fund is collected from the penalty of firms that cause the accidents. Part of the fund is applied to risk management research so that the overall safety level of the society can be improved, which is non- monetary compensation to the consumers (victims). Part of the fund serves as a subsidy for insurer's solvency. The insurer's incentive to supply liability insurance is raised through a subsidy of buffer fund.
    關聯: 國立政治大學學報, 82, 63-95
    資料類型: article
    顯示於類別:[第82期] 期刊論文

    文件中的檔案:

    檔案 描述 大小格式瀏覽次數
    fb160922171656.pdf1704KbAdobe PDF159檢視/開啟


    在政大典藏中所有的資料項目都受到原著作權保護.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - 回饋