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    政大機構典藏 > 政大學報 > 第78期 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/104808
    請使用永久網址來引用或連結此文件: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/104808


    題名: 侵權法與責任保險對於公共場所損害防阻意願之影響
    其他題名: Incentive of Risk Control, Tort Law and Liability Insurance for the Public Premises
    作者: 陳彩稚
    Chen, Tsai-Jyh
    貢獻者: 風管系
    關鍵詞: 過失主義;無過失主義;公共場所責任保險;損害防阻;損害不確定性
    NegligenceRule;StrictLiabilityPrinciple;LiabilityInsuranceofPublicPremises;IncentiveofSafetyCare;UncertaintyinLossSettlement
    日期: 1999-06
    上傳時間: 2016-12-12 16:44:43 (UTC+8)
    摘要: 由於近年來公共場所意外災害頻傳,政府有意實施公共場所強制責任保險,並採用無過失主義,以加強業者對於公共安全之重視。然而民營責任保險之供給與價格,自從1980年代起即已是市場上之一大難題,仰賴責任保險以減少意外事故,其效果乃值得商榷。本文藉由法律經濟學與保險理論之分析方法,探討侵權法之過失責任原則與責任保險,二者對於損害防阻意願之影響,並且納入事故肇因或損害賠償不確定因素之介入效果。研究結果認為(一)業者對於場所安全之改善意願,乃決定於損害防阻工作之淨效益而非法律制度,無過失主義並不必然能提高業者之意願;(二)強制責任保險並未能提高損害防阻意願,多數情況是降低其意願,除非費率結構特別設計加重處罰高風險被保人,才可能提高業者之安全改善意願;(三)當有事故肇因或損害賠償不確定因素介入時,無過失主義不會增加業者損害防阻意願,責任保險保費負擔只會促使其退出市場,然而過失主義卻會增加業者損害防阻意願,責任保險保費負擔不必然會影響其經營事業之意願。
    The public policy maker plans to implement the compulsory liability insurance with strict liability principle to provide the compensation for the injured in the public premises and to enhance the safety care taken by the firm. However, the availability and affordability of private liability insurance has been a serious problem in the insurance market since 1980's. The fundamental solution of public safety is to improve the risk control activities by the firms.This paper provides theoretical analysis of the effect of legal system (negligence rule vs. strict liability) and compulsory liability insurance on the incentive of safety care. The major findings of this study are: (l) the incentive of safety care of the firm is decided by the relative expected cost of risk control program to the expected benefit of damage reduction, instead of the liability rule of tort law; (2) the intervention of compulsory liability insurance will not encourage the incentive of safety care unless the premium rate is structured unfairly to make extra penalty on the high-risk insured; (3) when there is uncertainty in causation and/or claim settlement, strict liability law will not encourage the safety care but discourage the firm from attending the business, while the safety care is increased under negligence rule and the expected utility of attending business may be unchanged, increased, or decreased depending on the cost of risk control activities.
    關聯: 國立政治大學學報,78,413-439
    資料類型: article
    顯示於類別:[第78期] 期刊論文

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