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The Relationship between Personally Tax Aggressive Insiders and Corporate Tax Avoidance
Preference of insiders on tax avoidance
Relationship of insider and corporation
|Issue Date: ||2017-09-13 16:53:18 (UTC+8)|
Many prior studies uses exogenous variables such as insiders’ educational background, gender and average serving year, to discuss the relation between insiders and tax avoidance. It is difficult to attain personal tax information, so this research analyze the administrative appeal decision from Ministry of Finance to measure whether insiders have the characteristic in avoiding tax. This research assume insiders have tax avoiding characteristic if insiders violate income tax law 66-8. The empirical result of this research shows that when insiders incline to avoid personal income tax, the company insiders serve avoid more tax. This research thereby infer insiders with tax avoiding characteristic adopt more tax avoiding policy when managing company.
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|Source URI: ||http://thesis.lib.nccu.edu.tw/record/#G0103353103|
|Data Type: ||thesis|
|Appears in Collections:||[會計學系] 學位論文|
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