English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 11 |  Items with full text/Total items : 88645/118187 (75%)
Visitors : 23496112      Online Users : 298
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/122711


    Title: 聯合行為下寬恕政策的有效性分析
    An Analysis on the Effectiveness of Leniency Policy under Cartel
    Authors: 王智賢
    Wang, Jue-Shyan
    陳姿伶
    Chen, Tzu-Ling
    Contributors: 社會科學論叢
    Keywords: 寬恕政策;卡特爾;子賽局完全均衡;資訊不對稱;序列均衡
    Leniency Policy;Cartel;Subgame Perfect Equilibrium;Information Asymmetry;Sequential Equilibrium
    Date: 2018-06
    Issue Date: 2019-03-28 10:36:07 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: 寬恕政策為政府打擊卡特爾不可或缺的重要工具,為了維持市場競爭公平性,各國相繼將其引入法條之中,該政策透過廠商主動揭露涉案行為,使得政府可有效掌握證據將其處置。本文建立兩種賽局模型並分別利用子賽局完全均衡及序列均衡的概念,嘗試討論一般情況下寬恕政策的效率及納入資訊不對稱情形下的政策有效性,並由兩模型推論出:實行寬恕政策且廠商主動申報聯合行為為社會最有效率的均衡、透過政府制定適當的罰鍰區間引導下,主動申報聯合行為的行為可視為一區隔廠商型態的訊號。
    The leniency policy plays an indispensable role in thwarting cartel formation. To maintain the fairness of market competition, most countries successively bring this policy into their antitrust legislation. After the enforcement of the policy, the involved firms may have incentive to self-report and provide evidences to the Antitrust Authority. Therefore, the authorities can get enough evidence to convict those firms of being cartel members. In this paper, we develop two kinds of game theoretical model and use the concept of subgame perfect equilibrium and sequential equilibrium to discuss the efficiency of leniency policy in general conditions, and the effectiveness of the policy under the condition of information asymmetry. We show that it is efficient to the society and the authorities when the cartel members self-report under the enforcement of leniency policy. Moreover, by setting up an appropriate fine payment, self-reporting can be a signal for the authorities to segment the type of the involved firms.
    Relation: 社會科學論叢, 12(1), pp.31-61
    Data Type: article
    Appears in Collections:[社會科學論叢] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    102.pdf2688KbAdobe PDF44View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback