English  |  正體中文  |  简体中文  |  Post-Print筆數 : 11 |  Items with full text/Total items : 88668/118332 (75%)
Visitors : 23507321      Online Users : 276
RC Version 6.0 © Powered By DSPACE, MIT. Enhanced by NTU Library IR team.
Scope Tips:
  • please add "double quotation mark" for query phrases to get precise results
  • please goto advance search for comprehansive author search
  • Adv. Search
    HomeLoginUploadHelpAboutAdminister Goto mobile version
    政大機構典藏 > 學術期刊 > 會計評論 > 期刊論文 >  Item 140.119/122829
    Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://nccur.lib.nccu.edu.tw/handle/140.119/122829


    Title: Asymmetric Sensitivity of CEO Cash Compensation to Restructuring Charges and Restructuring Charge Reversals: The Impacts of Compensation Committee Effectiveness
    高階經理人現金薪酬對重組支出與重組支出迴轉之不對稱敏感度:論薪酬委員會有效性之影響
    Authors: 許慧雯
    Hsu, Hui-Wen
    蔡柳卿
    Tsai, Liu-Ching
    Contributors: 會計評論
    Keywords: Restructuring charges;Restructuring charge reversals;CEO compensation;Compensation committee effectiveness
    重組支出;重組支出迴轉;高階經理人薪酬;薪酬委員會有效性
    Date: 2018-07
    Issue Date: 2019-04-02 09:05:46 (UTC+8)
    Abstract: This study examines whether CEO cash compensation is less sensitive to restructuring charges than to the reversals of restructuring charges, i.e., an asymmetric treatment for restructuring charges and the related reversals. In addition, given that executive compensation design itself may be an agency problem, we also examine whether this asymmetric treatment varies with compensation committee effectiveness. Using a US sample of firm-year observations, this study finds that there is an asymmetric compensation sensitivity to restructuring charges and restructuring charge reversals. Furthermore, we find that highly effective compensation committees reduce the compensation weight more on restructuring charges and restructuring charge reversals compared to compensation committees characterized by low effectiveness. The overall results imply that firms with highly effective compensation committees encourage prospective restructuring activities by shielding executive compensation from the effect of restructuring charges, and filter restructuring charge reversals from CEO compensation to avoid opportunistic behavior of rent extraction. However, restructuring charge reversals are rewarded by committees characterized by low effectiveness through the placement of a higher compensation weight, which is consistent with the view of managerial rent extraction.
    Relation: 會計評論, 67, pp.1-40
    Data Type: article
    DOI 連結: https://doi.org/10.6552/JOAR.201807_(67).0001
    DOI: 10.6552/JOAR.201807_(67).0001
    Appears in Collections:[會計評論] 期刊論文

    Files in This Item:

    File Description SizeFormat
    127.pdf591KbAdobe PDF29View/Open


    All items in 政大典藏 are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved.


    社群 sharing

    著作權政策宣告
    1.本網站之數位內容為國立政治大學所收錄之機構典藏,無償提供學術研究與公眾教育等公益性使用,惟仍請適度,合理使用本網站之內容,以尊重著作權人之權益。商業上之利用,則請先取得著作權人之授權。
    2.本網站之製作,已盡力防止侵害著作權人之權益,如仍發現本網站之數位內容有侵害著作權人權益情事者,請權利人通知本網站維護人員(nccur@nccu.edu.tw),維護人員將立即採取移除該數位著作等補救措施。
    DSpace Software Copyright © 2002-2004  MIT &  Hewlett-Packard  /   Enhanced by   NTU Library IR team Copyright ©   - Feedback